The influence of queer theory on marriage and civil partnership in Scotland by Gormley, Charles M.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gormley, Charles Martin (2016) The influence of queer theory on 
marriage and civil partnership in Scotland. LL.M(R) thesis. 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7832/  
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
0905414G 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Influence of Queer Theory on 
Marriage and Civil Partnership in 
Scotland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0905414G 2 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 4 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 5 
1 The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge by Michel Foucault ............... 8 
1(1) Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 8 
1(2) Part one: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 8 
1(2)(a) ‘We Other Victorians’ .......................................................................................................... 9 
1(3) Part Two: ‘The Repressive Hypothesis’ ............................................................................. 11 
1(3)(a) The Incitement to Discourse ............................................................................................. 12 
1(3)(b) The Perverse Implantation ................................................................................................ 13 
1(4) Part Three ....................................................................................................................... 15 
1(4)(a) Scientia Sexualis ................................................................................................................ 15 
1(5) Part Four: The Deployment of Sexuality ........................................................................... 17 
1(5)(a) Chapter 1: Objective .......................................................................................................... 17 
1(5)(b) Chapter 2: Method ............................................................................................................ 18 
1(5)(c) Chapter 3: Domain............................................................................................................. 20 
1(5)(d) Chapter 4: Periodization ................................................................................................... 22 
1(6) Part Five .......................................................................................................................... 24 
1(6)(a) Right of Death and Power Over Life. ................................................................................. 24 
1(7) Conclusions for Queer Theory .......................................................................................... 27 
2 Gender Trouble by Judith Butler .................................................................................. 30 
2(1) Introduction .................................................................................................................... 30 
2(2) Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................... 31 
2(2)(a) Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire ......................................................................................... 31 
2(3) Chapter 2: Prohibition, Psychoanalysis and the Production of the Heterosexual Matrix. .... 35 
2(3)(a) Structuralism’s Critical Exchange. ..................................................................................... 35 
2(3)(b) Lacan, Riviere and the Strategies of Masquerade ............................................................ 37 
2(3)(c) Freud and the Melancholia of Gender .............................................................................. 39 
2(3)(d) Gender Complexity and the Limits of Identification ......................................................... 41 
2(3)(e) Reformulation of Prohibition as Power............................................................................. 42 
2(4) Chapter 3: Subversive Bodily Acts Introduction: ............................................................... 44 
2(4)(a) The Body Politics of Julia Kristeva ..................................................................................... 44 
2(4)(b) Foucault, Herculine and the Politics of Sexual Discontinuity ............................................ 45 
2(4)(c) Monique Wittig: Bodily Disintegration and Fictive Sex ..................................................... 47 
2(4)(e) Bodily Inscriptions, Performative Subversions .................................................................. 50 
2(4)(f) From Interiority to Gender Performatives ......................................................................... 51 
2(5): From Parody to Politics ................................................................................................... 52 
2(6): Conclusions for Queer Theory ......................................................................................... 52 
3: A Queer analysis of Marriage and Civil Partnership ..................................................... 56 
3(1): Introduction ................................................................................................................... 56 
3(2) What is Queer? ............................................................................................................... 58 
3(3) Queer objections to the social status of marriage ............................................................. 60 
0905414G 3 
3(4) Gender alignment............................................................................................................ 64 
3(4)(1) Marriage, Civil Partnership gender alignment: ................................................................. 64 
3(4)(2) Marriage, Civil Partnership and the Gender Recognition Act 2004 .................................. 65 
3(4)(3) The Gender Recognition Act 2004 .................................................................................... 68 
3(4)(4) Gender of parties to a marriage and civil partnership ...................................................... 72 
3(5) The influence of gender binarism on parties to a marriage or civil partnership .................. 75 
3(6) Religious and Belief Marriage and Civil Partnership: ......................................................... 81 
3(6)(1) Religious and belief marriages and civil partnership ceremonies .................................... 81 
4 Conclusion: .................................................................................................................. 88 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0905414G 4 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis will explore the whether queer theory has had any real influence on the law on 
marriage and civil partnership in Scotland.   It will do so by examining the work of Michael 
Foucault and Judith Butler, reviewing both The History of Sexuality Volume One, and Gender 
Trouble to establish what queer theory has to say on gender and sexuality.  Both works 
expose the artificiality of gender and sexuality, and in doing so, show that marriage and civil 
partnership are institutions created to support these artificial structures.  Marriage and civil 
partnership are not isolated from the continuing influence of queer discourse on both gender 
and sexuality; however, as I will show, the influence has been contained largely to opening 
up privilege, both legally and socially, to those who wish to conform to structures that remain 
heteronormative and prescriptive.   
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Introduction 
 
Marriage, and civil partnership in Scotland are the institutions by which relationships, 
presumably of romantic origin, are socially, religiously and legally recognised.  Marriage 
attracts legal privilege, is codified as a fundamental right,
1
 and, due to its elevated social 
status, is an aspiration for many.  Civil partnership, a distinctively same-sex institution, 
mirrors the legal privileges of marriage, and, I would argue, attracts a similar, though 
diminished, elevation in social status. The question which this thesis will ask is what, if any, 
influence queer theory has had on marriage and civil partnership in Scotland. 
Same-sex relationships have now reached a point of legal and social parity with those 
of their opposite-sex counterparts and can be formalised by entering into a marriage or a civil 
partnership.  I will argue that, on the periphery, queer theory has influenced the equality-led 
discourse that led to same-sex relationships being viewed as morally equivalent to opposite-
sex relationships.  However, I will demonstrate that, by and large, this is where the influence 
of queer theory ends in relation to both institutions.   
To establish the queer position on gender, sex and sexuality, I will first review The 
History of Sexuality Volume One: The Will to Knowledge by Michael Foucault.  Foucault 
exposes the artificiality of sexuality, showing it to be a social construct rather than an 
objectively observed reality; sexuality was created for the purposes of social control and the 
deployment of power. Marriage and civil partnership are, I will argue, emanations of this 
discourse on power and the influence of sexuality is still heavily present within the structure 
of marriage, despite changes to make marriage law gender neutral.  It hardly needs to 
bestated that civil partnership remains wedded to gender and sexuality due to its same-sex 
                                                          
1
 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 12 
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nature.  Foucault identifies the need to resist power; I will show that marriage and civil 
partnership remain, from a queer perspective, something to be resisted for that reason.   
Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble will then be reviewed.  Butler develops Foucault’s 
argument on sexuality, applying it to gender and exposing the same artificiality.  Butler 
shows that gender is simply a performance and via a review of psychoanalysis, anthropology, 
the biology of hermaphroditism and drag culture, she concludes that the presumed binary 
simply does not exist. Sex and gender are the same thing, and neither of them has any real 
basis in objective truth.  They are impositions, control mechanisms, artificial and, ultimately, 
valueless.  I will demonstrate that gender is perhaps more pervasive within marriage and civil 
partnership than sexuality, and that the influence of gender has perhaps increased since the 
introduction of same-sex marriage.  Queer theory, it will be shown, has had only a peripheral 
influence on the role of gender within marriage and civil partnership. 
Following a review of Foucault and Butler, I will critique the elevated social status 
afforded to marriage and civil partnership, concluding that this privileged status is only 
achievable at the expense of other groups.  From a queer perspective, I will argue that 
marriage and civil partnership are actually a triumph for social conservatism and are not 
reflective of any real queer influence.   
I will then review the influence and persistence of gender rules within marriage and 
civil partnership.  I will argue that despite the seeming gender neutrality of marriage law, 
gender persists within marriage and civil partnership.   Gender and marital or civil 
partnership status are interlinked within the Gender Recognition Act 2004; I will argue that 
the Gender Recognition Act 2004 has been used as a vehicle for the maintenance of the 
gender binary, and also, historically, to ensure the hetero-exclusivity of marriage.   
0905414G 7 
The influence of gender and heteronormativism is also still visible in the ‘couple’ 
structure of both marriage and civil partnership.   I will argue that both institutions remain 
fixated on reflecting structures that were historically a result of gender essentialism and 
gender complementarianism.   
Finally, I will look at religious marriage and civil partnership, examining the religious 
freedom protections put in place on the passing of same-sex marriage.  I will conclude that 
religious marriage and civil partnership ceremonies create discrimination in the 
administration of a state function, and that religious protection rules have created legal 
uncertainty.  It is perhaps unsurprising that I will conclude that queer theory has not 
influenced religious marriage at all. 
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1 The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge by Michel 
Foucault 
 
1(1) Introduction  
 
The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge by Michel Foucault is, if there 
is any such thing, a fundamental text for queer theorists.  Published in 1976, it argues that 
characterising our social history as one of sexual repression is inaccurate. In many ways the 
opposite is the case. Since the 17
th
 Century, discourse on sex, rather than being repressed, has 
exploded.  Discourse about sex, rather than being silenced, has taken on a number of different 
voices. Sex and sexuality as understood today is a modern creation of ‘the age of bio-power’ 
where government and society regulate our bodies.   Regulation could only occur after the 
deployment of sexuality, which is what Foucault argues has taken place. 
Foucault’s refusal to be categorised by binary hetero / homosexual labels appeals to 
queer theorists who wish to subvert labels such as ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘male’ and ‘female’.  
Whilst he does not address homosexuality in any detail within The History of Sexuality 
Volume 1, the influence of this work on queer theorists has been significant.  His commentary 
on power, knowledge and discourse were at the heart of many of the claims for liberation 
seen since publication, whilst his claim that sexuality is a construction enabled those outside 
of the ‘norm’ of heterosexuality to demand equality.   
1(2) Part one: Introduction 
 
In part one of The History of Sexuality: Volume One Foucault reinterprets the generally 
accepted history of sexuality.  He shows that the discourse on sexuality prior to the sexual 
revolution of the 1960 and beyond is not simply one of repression, and indeed, shows that on 
0905414G 9 
investigation, in many ways the opposite is case.  Foucault shows that repression is not 
completely absent, but that where it is present, repression is a productive form and function 
of the discourse on sexuality. 
 
1(2)(a) ‘We Other Victorians’ 
 
Foucault begins The History of Sexuality by outlining a view that he opposes: ‘The 
Repressive Hypothesis’, the view that society supported, and to a lesser degree perhaps 
continues to support, a regime where sexuality is restrained and silenced.
2
  ‘The Repressive 
Hypothesis’ states that until the beginning of the 17th Century, sexual discourse was frank and 
that there was a ‘tolerant familiarity with the illicit.’3  Unlike the 19th Century, legal rules 
regarding indecency and obscenity were lax, discourse was ‘shameless’ and children, who 
from this point were desexualised and protected from sexuality, mingled with adults who 
engaged freely in discourse
4
 about sexuality.  
What followed was a period where sexuality was restricted to the home, specifically 
the marital bed, and sexual discourse was muted.
 5
  The normative locus for sex became the 
procreative couple
6
 and anything that did not conform was silenced and denied existence.
7
  
This repressive strategy (Foucault does not consider it prohibitive)
8
 meant that sex became 
compulsory within marriage,
9
 whilst marriage and procreation became compulsory and 
                                                          
2
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume One: The Will to Knowledge, Translated by Robert Hurley 
(1978) 3 
3
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 3 
4
 Foucauldian discourse needs to be distinguished from simple discussion.  For Foucault discourse is not only 
dialogue or discussion, but is a broader concept, encompassing concepts of knowledge constitution, power 
relations, social norms and the subjective relations which attach to power and knowledge.  Sexuality, as he will 
demonstrate is a product of the discourse on power. 
5
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 3 
6
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 3 
7
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 4 
8
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 4 
9
 Mark G E Kelly, Foucault’s History of Sexuality Volume 1, The Will to Knowledge (2013), 17 
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indicative of normality.
10
  Bourgeois society of course conceded that there were sexualities 
that did not conform.   These were confined to controlled environments: the brothel and the 
mental institution, and the clients or patients were, according to Steven Marcus,
11
 the ‘other 
Victorians’.  Outside of these environments taboo and repression reigned,12 and even the 
advent of Freudian ‘enlightenment’ reinforced the medicalization of non-conforming 
sexualities, failing to illuminate discourse in any significant way. 
13
  
By situating the repressive era in the seventeenth century alongside the development 
of capitalism, repression becomes an ‘integral part of the bourgeois order’.14 Sex and 
sexuality become examples of exploitative modes of production, with the liberation of 
sexuality therefore a revolutionary political cause.
15
  Acknowledging the relationship 
between sex and power as repressive means we appear to be defying established power by 
discussing it at all.
16
  Sexuality is linked to a discourse synonymous with confession and 
revelation,
17
 and subjugation is coupled with a revelatory and revolutionary discourse.
18
  It is 
a mutually reinforcing cycle of repression and revelation
19
. 
Foucault intends to investigate our repressive silence, a plight we loudly discuss 
despite our repressed state.
20
   He raises three doubts about the repressive hypothesis: is it an 
established historical fact; is power repressive; and finally, did the critical discourse that 
addressed repression challenge or reinforce it by being part of the same repressive 
                                                          
10
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 4 
11
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 4 
12
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 5 
13
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 5 
14
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 5 
15
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 6 
16
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 6 
17
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 7 
18
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 7 
19
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 7 
20
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 7 
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mechanism?
21
  Foucault is not claiming that sexuality has not been a taboo subject, but 
instead intends to ask how and why sexuality has become an object of discussion.
22
 In other 
words, he wishes to know who speaks about sex, what are they saying, what institutions 
prompt this discourse and what do these institutions do with the discourse produced.
23
  
Foucault is not claiming that the repressive hypothesis is wrong about the facts, he simply 
disagrees with it as an interpretation of the facts
24
 believing that we place too much emphasis 
on it when accounting for the history of sexuality.
25
  
The repressive hypothesis is not totally false, then, but simply inadequate as a single 
history of sexuality.  Its factual existence is questioned by Foucault, but he recognises that, 
even so, the repressive hypothesis is itself a form of discourse, and our insistence on talking 
of our repression signifies a desire for knowledge and power.  Essentially, Foucault’s 
investigation into sexuality is ultimately an investigation into power and knowledge.  More 
generally, Foucault challenges the perception that repression is the means by which power 
exerts itself within society; he sees power as productive rather than repressive, and the 
repressive aspect of sexuality is therefore but one facet of the production.
26
  
1(3) Part Two: ‘The Repressive Hypothesis’  
 
In part two, Foucault expands on his submission that the history of sexuality is not simply 
one of repression.   He does this by revealing the areas of the discursive expansion on 
sexuality, showing how regulation and control in many ways encourage us to engage in 
discourse on sexuality, through the religious confessional and the medical and legal 
professions.  He reveals how extra-marital sexual activity was categorised, often as a 
                                                          
21
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 10 
22
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 11 
23
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 11 
24
 Kelly, Foucault’s History of Sexuality 28 
25
 Kelly, Foucault’s History of Sexuality 22 
26
 Kelly, Foucault’s History of Sexuality 23 
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perversion, and for the purposes of prohibition and regulation.  Doomed to failure, these 
regulatory regimes simply produced what they sought to control.   
 
1(3)(a) The Incitement to Discourse 
 
Looking back at the period between the 17
th
 and 20
th
 Centuries, it is clear to Foucault that 
sexuality was not repressed in the way that the repressive hypothesis would have us believe.
27
  
Without doubt, the language of sexuality became more discreet,
28
  however, from the 18
th
 
century onwards there was an explosion of discourse
29
 particularly amongst those in positions 
of power.
30
   
The thoughts and deeds revealed in the Catholic confessional were the epicentre of 
the 17
th
 Century discursive explosion.
31
   Sex was transformed into discourse here.
32
 
Confessional culture permeated society in the form of scandalous, ‘tell everything’, 
pornographic literature, converting sex to discourse in a similar way.
33
  
Increasing statistical analysis in the 18
th
 century saw further categorisation of sex and 
sexuality.   The medical establishment conceded the necessity of examining, and discussing, 
sex as a perceived requirement of demography.
34
  Sexual discourse was necessary so that sex 
could be managed, utilised, optimised and administered,
35
 assisting with economic and 
political development.
36
 During this period discussion of sexuality in front of children was 
                                                          
27
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 17 
28
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 18 
29
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 18 
30
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 18 
31
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 18 
32
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 20 
33
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 23 
34
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 24 
35
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 24 
36
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 25 
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restricted,
37
 with educational institutions designed to avoid children and adolescents engaging 
in sexual activity.
38
 Discourse surrounding child sexuality was typified by discussion on how 
childhood sexuality should be banished from everyday discussion with the enforced silence 
functioning less as the limit of discourse but simply another facet of it.
39
  In other words, 
silence became an element of discourse. Concurrently, medicine, psychiatry and the criminal 
law also produced their own sexual discourses, indicators of when sex and sexual ‘deviancy’ 
moved from being ignored to being discussed openly.
40
 The generally accepted view that sex 
was censored is, in fact, the opposite of what occurred.  Instead, a mechanism was created to 
allow for a greater quantity of discourse on sex to take place, particularly by those with 
power.
41
   
Foucault’s main argument is that discourse on sex has increased since the 17th 
Century, although he concedes that how people talk about sex has changed in this time.  
Confession has evolved into analytics, and this is a direct result of the relationship between 
power and sex.  As sex has become an object of knowledge, its power has increased as it is 
deployed by the law, medicine and religion. 
1(3)(b) The Perverse Implantation 
 
It has been argued that the objective of this increased discourse on sex is identifying and 
controlling non-reproductive sexual activity.
42
 Foucault disagrees
43
 arguing that sexuality 
encompasses more than reproductive necessity and that sexual ‘perversion’ has multiplied in 
this time. 
                                                          
37
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 27 
38
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 27 
39
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 27 
40
 Kelly, Foucault’s History of Sexuality 37 
41
 Kelly, Foucault’s History of Sexuality 37 
42
 Kelly, Foucault’s History of Sexuality 39 
43
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 37 
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Until the end of the 18
th
 Century, Church and Civil Law governed sexual practices.
44
 
These codes determined what was acceptable or unacceptable, centred essentially on 
behaviour within marriage.   All sex outside of marriage tended to be prohibited but 
ignored.
45
 The discursive exposition of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 Centuries shifted this focus from 
marital restrictions to the ‘unnatural’ sexuality of extra-marital sex.  Foucault uses Don Juan, 
a fictional uber-promiscuous heterosexual to illustrate his point.  Don Juan’s sexual activity is 
categorised as unnatural and perverted;
46
 at the same time the pervert is pathologised and 
becomes an object for medical or criminal incarceration.
47
  
 The medicalization of sexuality was universal, allowing increased control,
48
 although 
to do so it was necessary to produce sexuality, rather than prohibit it.
49
  Rather than 
categorising and controlling acts, modern forms of control categorised people – prohibited 
sexual acts became aligned with the nature of the actor.
50
 Homosexuality for example, 
became synonymous with the person: in other words, sexuality suffused the subject’s whole 
being and he became a ‘homosexual’ rather than ‘a sodomite’ who committed an act that 
could be punished and corrected.
51
 
What homosexuality shared with the other created sexualities was that it did not exist 
prior to this time and was a production of the power trying to supress perversion, which, in 
actuality, suppressed nothing and created that which it claimed to oppose.
52
  This form of 
power required discourse to function.
53
 The power, instead of creating boundaries, created 
                                                          
44
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 37 
45
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 37 
46
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 39 
47
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 40 
48
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 41 
49
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 42 
50
 Kelly, Foucault’s History of Sexuality 41 
51
 Kelly, Foucault’s History of Sexuality 41 
52
 Kelly, Foucault’s History of Sexuality 43 
53
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 44 
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and extended sexuality.
54
  Modern industrial society, rather than ushering in an age of 
increased sexual repression, was one in which unorthodox sexualities exploded.
55
 Rather than 
society silencing prohibited sexual activity, the opposite was in fact true.
56
 Increased scrutiny 
meant that sexual discourse exploded within society. 
1(4) Part Three 
 
In part three Foucault explores the difference between the Eastern and Western approach to 
sex.  In the west, he shows how sex was pathologised, categorised and used for the purposes 
of demographic analysis and control.  He demonstrates that this so-called scientific approach 
when looking at human sexuality has been governed by the prevalent morality of the day – a 
distinctly unscientific approach in other words.  He contrasts this with the Eastern approach 
to seeking the truth about sex, where truth is sought in the actuality of sex, rather than being 
subordinated to what is considered right and wrong,  
 
1(4)(a) Scientia Sexualis 
 
Foucault supposes that it will be conceded that there has been an explosion of sexual 
discourse and that, even with taboos and prohibitions, it has created a sexual multiplicity.
57
 
He argues however that this was not the intention, and that concealing the true connection of 
sexuality to moral imperatives was in fact the goal.
58
  He argues that until Freud, all scientific 
discourse on sex was subordinate to moral imperatives, ascribing perversion to the least 
deviations of sexuality and warning of the dangers to society.
59
 Whilst the biological science 
of animal and botanical reproduction was developed along general scientific rules, the 
                                                          
54
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 44 
55
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 49 
56
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 49 
57
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 53 
58
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 53 
59
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 53 
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science of human sex conformed to different, morality-governed rules.
60
 What Foucault 
believes is important is not the recognition of when we became newly rational about sex, but 
that we accept that we have inherited some of the blindness of the 19
th
 Century in our 
ongoing search for the truth about sexuality, and that this search for truth is not a new one.
61
 
Historically, there have been two methods of producing the truth about sex.  In the ars 
erotica, present in Eastern societies, truth is drawn from pleasure itself, rather than in relation 
to law or utility, with knowledge deflected back into the sexual practice to shape it from 
within: ‘secrecy’ is utilised only to intensify pleasure.62 The ars erotica is contrastable with 
Western civilisation where the scientia sexualis is practiced – a mechanism for establishing 
truth as a constituent of power-knowledge.
63
 The secrets of scienta sexualis are shameful and 
revealing them an act of confession where the listener, not the speaker, has the power. 
Foucault is contrasting sex-as-a-science against sex-as-an-art.   
Confession has now become so culturally ingrained that we no longer see it as an 
effect of constraining power
64
 and see it now as a way to seek the truth.
65
 The reality is that it 
is simply encouraged and conditioned by power.
66
  Sex becomes something within an 
unrelenting system of confessions 
67
 where we are constituted as both passive and active 
subjects through the process of confession - participation creates a power-relationship, as a 
confessor is required.
68
   It is through confession that scienta sexualis has developed and it 
remains the mechanism by which truth is discursively produced about sex, as we have been 
conditioned to believe it is liberating.    
                                                          
60
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 54 
61
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 57 
62
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 57 
63
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 58 
64
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 60 
65
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 60 
66
 Kelly, Foucault’s History of Sexuality 49 
67
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 61 
68
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 61 
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1(5) Part Four: The Deployment of Sexuality  
 
Part four of The History of Sexuality: Volume One is specifically about power and its relation 
to sexuality.  Foucault shows that power is omnidirectional and in many ways rises from 
below, rather than being a restrictive power wielded from above.  He shows that power is not 
a constraint on sex, but is rather inherent to sexuality; furthermore, he reveals that sexuality is 
not natural at all, but is instead a social construction and a crossroads of power relations.  It 
has not, as has been assumed by many, been repressed for social and economic reasons, but 
rather, it has been produced for these self-same reasons. 
 
1(5)(a) Chapter 1: Objective 
 
Foucault wishes to determine why we place such emphasis on sexuality and why we believe 
knowledge and truth on the subject will liberate us.  He is not alone in arguing that sex is not 
repressed: psychoanalysts have taken the position that power and desire are interlinked in a 
way that cannot be characterised as prohibition versus rebellion.
69
 Power creates both desire 
and its absence. In other words, desire only exists when there is a repressive power 
constraining us.
70
   
Foucault criticises this conception of power as juridico-discursive and he intends to 
liberate power from this characterisation which he identifies as always being repressive, 
taking the form of law.
71
  In this model, sex is always something that power constrains and 
there is therefore always a negative relationship between power and sex.  Power determines 
                                                          
69
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 81 
70
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 82 
71
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 86 
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how sex is treated, understood, suppressed and prohibited. In this model, power is seen as 
being exercised in the same way at all levels.
72
 
This inadequate characterisation of power is accepted by us because we would find 
the true face of power unacceptable.
73
 We can accept prohibitive power but not ‘generative’ 
power
74
 largely because our conception of power is monarchical.
75
 The juridico-discursive 
model is traced to the middle ages when law became equated with power.   The juridical 
representation of power is present in the analysis of power to sex
76
 leading us to believe both 
the repressive hypothesis and the restrictive characterisation of power.
77
  
 
1(5)(b) Chapter 2: Method 
 
Foucault’s intention is to analyse sex in terms of power, understood as an omnidirectional 
force, inherent within everything.
78
  Everything is conditioned by power because power 
emanates from everybody and everything.
79
  Power is not a person, not an institution and is 
not a ‘strength’ we can obtain or be endowed with and should be understood as a relational 
situation within society.
80
   Whilst the position a person holds may have power, this does not 
make the person powerful as the power sits with the position, not the holder.
81
  In other 
words, we are all affected by power, and we all generate power.   
                                                          
72
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 84 
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The effects of power do not issue from above, instead, radiating from below.
82
 Power 
relationships are intentional, their effects calculated and their aims defined, although it is 
rarely the case that a single actor or institution has articulated the calculus and objectives.
83
 
Power creates resistance, an internal component of power rather than an external force
84
 and 
like power, resistance has no central nexus or identifiable actor or institution; power is 
therefore inescapable.
85
  The consequence of this conception of power is that sex and 
sexuality cannot have been produced from some powerful agency and we must therefore ask 
how it has been produced from below.
86
 It is notable that power has produced, rather than 
restricted sex and sexuality so we must enquire how power relations affected the production 
of discourse on sex.
87
  
It is not possible to have knowledge of sexuality, or to enquire into sexuality, without 
the presence of power.  Foucault calls this ‘the rule of imminence’ meaning that power is 
inherent to sexuality.
88
  Power continually changes and it is therefore pointless to seek the 
person wielding or deprived of it; this ‘rule of continual variation’ means that we should 
instead seek out the transformative matrices of relations of power-knowledge.
89
  The ‘rule of 
double conditioning’ means that the individual and the collective are both dependent on each 
other and neither would be fully actualised without the other.
90
 Finally, discourse on 
sexuality, or any other area, should not be viewed as self-contained.   The rule of the ‘tactical 
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polyvalence of discourse’ means that it can be combined with other discourses to suit the 
tactical situation of deployment.
91
  
1(5)(c) Chapter 3: Domain 
 
Sexuality is not an entity repressed by power or discovered by investigation.
92
  Sexuality is a 
social construct and a junction of power relations. 
93
 Our concept of sexuality is gleaned from 
how we use it and how useful it is to us – how it is deployed by us and against us. 94 
Beginning in the 18
th
 Century, there were four strategic unities that formed specific 
mechanisms of knowledge and power about sex.
95
  Firstly,  ‘a hysterization of women’s 
bodies’ – essentially that women’s bodies are particularly sexual when compared with men’s, 
pathologising their sexuality and focusing on their reproductive responsibilities; women’s 
bodies became an object of medical knowledge.
96
 Secondly, a pedagogization of children’s 
sex – a paradoxical assertion that children are naturally prone to indulge in sexual activity 
whilst deeming it absolutely inappropriate.
97
 Thirdly, a socialization of procreative behaviour 
– reproduction became the concern of society and therefore politicised and ‘managed’.98 
Finally, the psychiatrization of perverse pleasure – sexuality was categorised as biological 
and psychological and was assigned normalised behaviour on the one hand and pathologised 
behaviour to be corrected on the other.
99
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These strategies produced sexuality,
100
 not a natural phenomenon repressed by power 
101
 but instead a social device
102
 contrastable with the device of alliance, a system of 
managing heterosexual marriage and reproduction, existent in almost every culture.
 103
  
Whilst the locus of both sexuality and alliance is the family, the significance of alliance has 
decreased since the importance of sexuality has increased.
104
  Sexuality evolved from alliance 
and the rules of alliance informed what was permissible when creating sexuality. 
Sexuality was extra-familial
105
 before being absorbed by by the family
106
 to support 
alliance.
107
  The conflicts between alliance and sexuality became problematic. Family, the 
core of alliance, was the locus of all of the problems of sexuality.
108
  From the mid-19
th
 
century the family purged itself of intra-familial sexuality,
109
 resulting in the incest taboo.
110
  
Sexuality was deployed, meaning it was used to embed, control and create mechanisms of 
power. Alliance could not be deployed so successfully as it focused only on marital sex and 
exogamic heterosexuality - sexuality, on the other hand, could be deployed throughout the 
whole of society, particularly when coupled with alliance.
111
 We cannot therefore adequately 
categorise the history of sex as one in which sexuality was repressed for political or economic 
reasons; sex was deployed for these very reasons.
112
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1(5)(d) Chapter 4: Periodization 
 
If we read the history of sexuality as one of repression, two fractures appear.
113
 The first is 
the 17
th
 century restriction of sexuality to marriage;
114
 the second, the sexual revolution of the 
mid-twentieth century.
115
  Foucault intends to disprove this repressive view by tracing the 
chronology of sexuality,
116
 from its roots in the Christian confessional 
117
 via the 18
th
 Century 
entrenchment in state institutions,
118
 focusing on pedagogy, the medicine of the female sexual 
physiology, and the demography of birth statistics coupled with the prohibition on 
contraception.
119
  These axes also relate to the four strategies detailed earlier.  
The Christian roots of the axes were transformed from death and damnation into 
pathology and illness.
120
 Sex was separated from anatomical medicine with sexual 
abnormality indicative of sexual pathology demonstrable through sexual behaviour.
121
  
Concurrently, heredity placed sex in a position of biological responsibility assuming that sex 
could be affected by its own diseases afflicting future generations.
122
 This theory of 
‘degenerescence’ concluded that heredity, burdened with disease, produced a sexual 
pervert;
123
 in other words, bad breeding resulted in defective offspring.  Degenerescence 
formed the core of the new technologies of sex, underpinning psychiatry, jurisprudence, legal 
medicine, social control and child protection.
124
   Modern psychiatry ultimately made 
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degenerescence obsolete.  This chronology, dominated by confessional techniques and the 
growth of psychiatry is less a history of repression and more a history of invention.
125
  
If repression were related to the utilization of labour capacity, as the repressive 
hypothesis states, repressive techniques would be applied most acutely to the poorer classes 
and to the young adult male.
126
  This, however, is the opposite of what occurred, despite 
Marxist suppositions.
127
  The same can be said for the family as an agency of control – it was 
in the bourgeois family that women were first hysterised and children desexualised as only 
they, and the nobility, could afford medical interventions or psychiatry; the same classes were 
the regular attendees of confession.
128
  Sexual repression was created to distinguish the sexual 
activities of the bourgeoisie from the working classes, however, they did so by placing 
constraints upon themselves. 
The working classes initially escaped the deployment of sexuality, and when 
eventually caught within its net they were reeled in in three successive waves - the discovery 
and prohibition of working class birth control;
129
 the family deployed as an instrument of 
political and economic control
130
 and, finally, the legal control of perversion as necessary for 
the protection of society and the human race.
131
  It was only then, when the deployment of 
sexuality was maximised, that it spread through the entre social body.
132
 Sexual repression 
was not the tool of the bourgeoisie, but sexuality was.
133
 
It is clear here that Foucault interprets the history of sexuality as one in which class 
dominance played a role.  Sexuality is an invention, created for the propagation of the 
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bourgeoisie.  Having dismissed the juridico-discursive model of power for one which is 
omnidirectional, along with identifying that sexuality is a social construction and locus of 
many power relationships, he demonstrates this by showing how the bourgeoisie created what 
it commonly thought of today as ‘sexuality’.  Sexuality then is not, as the repressive 
hypothesis proposes, outside of power and controlled by it, but is instead a mechanism to 
channel power. 
 
1(6) Part Five 
 
In part five, Foucault introduces his concept of Bio-Power, the method by which the state 
regulates and subjugates our bodies for the purposes of control.  Bio-power manages this 
through the discipline of the body and by population regulation.  This power is exercised 
through sex, which, rather than being viewed as a function of our body parts, is actually also 
exposed as a social construction, something which is linked to a number of social and 
political contexts.  Sex is something which we discuss less in a functional way, and more as a 
relational aspect to many other considerations in our lives.  It is conditioned by power, 
created by it, and it is impossible to step outside of it.  Sex as we understand it today does not 
exist outside of sexuality and is simply a created concept that enables us to engage with the 
various discourses on sexuality. 
 
1(6)(a) Right of Death and Power Over Life. 
 
The absolute right of the Sovereign to decide life and death has diminished over time.
134
 
Transforming initially into a power to expose a subject to potential death in war or permit the 
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execution of criminals,
135
 essentially a power of seizure,
136
 the power now manifests itself as 
a power to maintain and develop life.
 137
 The power to take life or let live has been replaced 
by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death.
138
  
Starting in the 17
th
 Century, the power over life evolved in two ways.  The first, an 
anatamo-politics of the human body, centred on the body as a machine to be optimised, 
disciplined, utilised and integrated into economic and efficiency systems.
139
 Institutions such 
as schools, hospitals, universities and factories emerged to comprise this first pole of 
evolution.
140
 The second pole focused on the body as a biological organism for reproduction 
and the maximisation of life expectancy through health and mortality; this was a bio-politics 
of the population
141
 comprising of observation, statistics and interventions.
142
   
These disciplines constituted a bipolar technology of the body, a power whose 
function was no longer to take life, but to maximise it.
143
  Capitalism would have been 
impossible without these disciplines with bio-politics creating a healthy workforce and 
anatamo-politics necessary to create industrial production.
144
  Resistance to bio-power whilst 
ubiquitous demands the right to life, over the body, to health; it seeks inclusion in the 
protection of bio-power, rather than its abolition.
145
 
Sovereign power is not obliterated by bio-power; instead, power takes on a dual 
purpose, repressive and nurturing.
146
 Law is diminished as bio-power partially replaced it 
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with ‘the norm’147 and, bound to enforcement via the binary of right and wrong, it is 
contrastable with bio-power which is not as concerned with separating the licit from the 
illicit.
148
 Law is brought into the bio-power process of graded measurement, and comes to 
operate itself as a norm and judicial institutions are incorporated into a continuum of 
apparatuses.
149
   Sex was at the centre of both axes along which developed the political 
technology of life; this is why it assumed such importance, tied as it was to both the 
disciplines of the body and the regulation of populations.
150
  This is also why, in the 19
th
 
Century, the smallest details of sexuality were sought out.
151
 
Foucault’s fixation on history could see him accused of failing to notice sexuality, 
discoverable via psychology and physiology, rather than history.
152
  He claims that an 
analysis of sexuality does not necessarily imply a merging of body, anatomy, biology and 
function
153
 and that discussing sexuality without reference to biology does not imply a 
rejection of biological facts.
154
  He is not reciting a history of how people thought, but instead 
is articulating a history of bodies - a history of what occurred at a material level. 
Is it possible to narrate the history of sexuality without questioning sex?
155
  Foucault 
is dubious of the very notion of sex, believing it to be an idea formed across different power 
strategies,
156
 an entity born of sexuality.
157
 Sex is more than bodies, organs and sensations 
and has properties of its own
158
 and the strategies he enumerated demonstrate that the 
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artificial unity of biology, body, pleasure and utility are essentially politically expedient
159
 
and quasi-scientific.
160
  Sex made it possible to invert the relationship of power to sexuality, 
making sexuality something rooted in an urgent irreducibility which power tries to dominate; 
sex allows us to evade what empowers power.
161
  Sex then is not an autonomous agent, but is 
instead an element of the deployment of sexuality.
162
 However, sex is not the agent of 
sexuality - if anything, sex is subordinate to sexuality.  Sexuality is a historic formation and 
is, in fact, what gave rise to the notion of sex as its object.
163
 It is through sex that everyone 
understands himself, his body and his identity.
164
   
 
1(7) Conclusions for Queer Theory 
Foucault’s The History of Sexuality: Volume One is significant to queer theorists for a 
number of reasons.  By revealing that the history of sexuality was not simply one of 
repression, Foucault shows that the controlling mechanisms deployed since the 17
th
 Century, 
up to and including the sexual revolution of the 1960s, were simply deployments of a 
discourse on sexuality. The purpose of this discourse was less the exposure of the naturality 
of heterosexuality and more the creation of a normative basis for heterosexuality aligned with 
the need to manage and control the subject.  Homosexuality was created as an object of 
knowledge to allow this to take place, but in doing so, homosexuality was imbued with a 
power of its own.  Heterosexuality, whilst also created, was, in many, less an object of 
knowledge as it was presented as a natural phenomenon in need of no investigation, no 
confession and absolution, and not subject to the criminal law.  
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The exposure of the artificiality of sexuality allows for alternative positions to be 
articulated, positions that argue that sexual acts are not definitional and that heterosexuality is 
no more natural that homosexuality. By pathologising homosexuality and creating discourse 
and knowledge about it, a ‘reverse discourse’ was also created.165 Homosexuals began to 
speak on their own behalf, using the same vocabulary and categories, and demanding that 
their ‘naturality’ be acknowledged.166  In many ways, the sexual identity politics that 
followed was a development of Foucault’s work.  
What Foucault has identified is that sexuality is a product of the evolution of the 
discourses on the subject of sexuality, rather than an exposition of the facts of the matter 
obtained through objective observation.  Indeed, Foucault claims that objectivity has, at some 
points, been singularly absent when discourse on sexuality has been produced.  The science 
of sexuality, or scientia sexualis, was a development of discursive practice; when the subject 
of this observation is located in the shifting grounds of the subjective reality of discourse, 
there can be no stable subject, or object, of study. 
In articulating the age of bio-power, Foucault shows how sexuality has been deployed 
as a mechanism of control.  Homosexuality was created as a negative sexuality to reinforce 
the positivity of heterosexuality.  This artificial binarism articulates two categories: 
heterosexuality, the unproblematic default category to which everyone is presumed to belong; 
and homosexuality, a problematized category which is designated as an aberration.  Foucault 
shows that the problematic categorisation of homosexuality exists simply to allow for the 
existence of heterosexuality in an unproblematic state.   Heterosexuality is defined by its 
normality, but for this to be so, abnormality has to be created.  Homosexuality is therefore a 
relational category rather than a true, objectively observed status.  As heterosexuality is a 
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category with a privileged status, homosexuality is therefore a category of disadvantage; the 
bio-power discourse becomes pervasive and self-policing in an attempt to ensure that subjects 
are not exiled from the privileged class.
167
  
Foucault’s overall model of discourse, power and knowledge was useful in providing 
a base to challenge not just heteronormativity, but also in countering homonormativity - that 
is, that there is an acceptable model of the gay man or lesbian.  The homonormative model 
simply excludes other groups who do not conform to the artificial hetero-homo binary and it 
is evident throughout The History of Sexuality: Volume One that these binaries have been 
created with the purpose of regulation and control without any basis in naturality.  All 
sexualities, be they culturally acceptable or not, have the same creator, and that creator is the 
discourse on sexuality.  The revelation that sexuality is a product of discourse allows for 
strategies of confrontation and resistance to be devised. 
The History of Sexuality: Volume One challenges, in many ways, the very core of our 
understanding of the concept of ‘self’.  Sexuality has become a fundamental concept that 
defines a person.  Foucault exposes that this ‘self-definition’ cannot be viewed autonomously, 
and that it is, instead, a product of collectivity, of discourse, and of power relations.  Sexual 
identity, whatever form that may take, is not natural, and is as illusory as other attributes that 
we presume to be foundational.  Gender is another of these presumed foundational attributes, 
and it is to gender that the next chapter turns in the review of Gender Trouble by Judith 
Butler.  Butler develops Foucault’s work on sexuality by examining feminist theories of 
gender using the same poststructuralist approach.  As will be shown, she demonstrates that 
gender is simply a production of the same discourse that produced sexuality.  
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2 Gender Trouble by Judith Butler 
 
2(1) Introduction 
 
Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble is a further foundational text for queer theorists.  Whereas 
Foucault focused on power, showing how it created sexuality for the purposes of regulation 
and control, Butler focuses on imposed universality and gender performativity.  Some 
feminists noted that Foucault’s study had focused almost exclusively on male homosexuality 
when exploring the ‘deviant’.168 In Gender Trouble, Butler shows that gender, like sexuality, 
is a performative effect, a social construction. 
She firstly exposes that gender universality, uncritically and un-controversially 
accepted as the norm, is, in fact, a fiction which takes no account of cultural specifics when 
considering the patriarchy.  The feminist need for a universal feminine subject around which 
to coalesce is revealed to be a fiction that simply reinforces the gender binary, despite its 
seeming inseparability from identity and identity politics. 
Butler examines the gender investigations of anthropologists and psychiatrists, 
showing again that gender is in fact relational, understood only within a heterosexist 
framework. The anthropological foundations upon which gender identity is constructed are, 
at best, unstable.  The psychological examinations focus on the resolution of the Oedipal / 
incest taboo, and here, Butler exposes that homosexuality and polymorphism are, in fact, 
foundational, whereas heterosexuality is a product of the resolution of this conflict. 
Finally, Butler shows that gender is simply a performative concept, but one in which 
we are unable to refuse to participate.  We cannot stand outside of gender, regardless of 
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whether refusals to participate in the binary are voluntary or arise through biological reality.  
She shows, by utilising drag, that performance is simply all that gender is, and in doing so, 
sets gender free. 
2(2) Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In chapter one, Butler challenges the notion that women are a singular category, capable of 
representation.  She questions the universality of the feminine subject and exposes the 
artificiality of gender and sex, both binary creations of the same discourse identified as 
oppressive in feminist theory.  Whilst Butler accepts that it is not possible to step outside of 
the existing power matrix, she identifies positive opportunities in departing from 
foundationalism. 
 
2(2)(a) Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire 
 
Is it possible to categorise ‘women’ as universal subjects, in the the way that feminist theory 
has sought to?
169
  If, as Foucault identifies, juridical systems of power produce the subjects 
they come to represent,
170
 prohibition, regulation and controlling systems will produce that 
which they seek to prohibit, control and regulate.  The feminist subject is therefore 
reproduced by a system that requires her for its existence and it is therefore unlikely to be a 
system which emancipates her.
171
  It is possible that, on investigation, ‘women’ may be 
incapable of representation as the universal identity we have ascribed to them may be a social 
construct of the system of control.
172
 
                                                          
169
 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (Second Edition) Routledge (London, 1999) 3 
170
 Butler, Gender Trouble 4 
171
 Butler, Gender Trouble 4 
172
 Butler, Gender Trouble 5 
0905414G 32 
The political assumption that there is a universally oppressed feminist subject has 
been criticised for failing to account for culturally-contextual gender oppression; in other 
words, the assumption only acknowledges that which supports the theory of universality. This 
criticism has undermined a theory of universal patriarchal domination
173
 although the 
perceived universality of the female subject has proven to be more robust.
174
  Butler suggests 
that  
‘the presumed universality and unity of the subject of feminism is effectively 
undermined by the constraints of the representational discourse in which it functions.  
Indeed, the premature insistence on the stable subject of feminism, understood as a 
seamless category of women inevitably generates multiple refusals to reject the 
category’175   
Butler’s assertion is that feminism undermines itself by insisting that women are a 
cohesive group with an identical agenda: this assertion fails to account for the fact that the 
category ‘woman’ is a product of discourse, or from the production of what Foucault would 
call ‘reverse-discourse’.176  Universality in the feminist context is coercive 
andmisrepresentative
177
 and understandable only in the male / female heterosexual matrix. 
Feminism needs to be reproduced to be reflective of this.
178
  
If we accept sex as an anatomical fact, and gender as a cultural imposition, then one 
cannot be said to necessarily follow the other; it does not follow that the construction of 
‘men’ will fall only to males, and ‘women’ to females. The presumption of a binary system 
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implicitly supports the relation of gender to sex, one mirroring, or restricting the other.
179
  We 
must ask how our given sex or gender was ‘given’ in the first place.  Butler suggests that 
indeed sex is simply a gendered category, produced by gender and therefore artificial.
180
  
Having a gender infers possession, which in itself infers acquisition, whereas being a gender 
infers an element of assumption and interpretation.  If gender is a cultural interpretation of 
sex, what is the mechanism of construction and how do we become it?  Could it be 
constructed differently or is it socially determined, foreclosing agency or transformation?  Is 
it acquired or imposed?
181
   
Simone de Beauvoir
182
 suggests that ‘one is not born a woman, but, rather, becomes 
one’183 implying both construction and agency,184  and also implying that one could 
appropriate whatever gender one chose.
185
  Butler proposes that whether gender is fixed, or 
chosen, it is a function of a discourse which limits analysis of gender by presupposing certain 
aspects of humanity rooted in binarism.
186
  Gender, for Butler, is as artificial as sex.  It is a 
binary differentiating characteristic as well as an analytical fact.  This relational aspect of 
gender, it has been argued, is in fact all that gender is; it is not an individual attribute, and for 
some, only the female gender is differentiated, with the male a genderless default.
187
  
The universality of both the category ‘women’ and masculine oppression is 
questioned in contemporary feminist debates as normative and exclusionary.
188
  It is assumed 
that coalition requires solidarity at any cost as a pre-requisite for political action.
189
 Butler is 
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unsympathetic to this approach and believes that departing from foundationalism could 
encourage inclusion,
190
 whilst discouraging conformance with pre-set identities.
191
   This 
more inclusive approach would also acknowledge the artificiality of the category ‘women’ 
and concede that ‘women’ occupy differing positions of power.192  
 If we only understand personhood via the binary of male/female, is it even possible to 
separate gender and identity? Isn’t our conception of gender and identity simply shaped by 
the regulatory practices that for Foucault, produce the truth about sex?  The determinist 
approach to sexuality and gender assumes that everyone is heterosexual.  This requires the 
binarism of male and female as expressions of feminine and masculine and anything not in 
conformance with this is denied existence. However, this denial simply creates that which it 
aims to exterminate and ultimately reveals the limits of regulation.    
The destruction of the category of sex would eliminate what is essentially an attribute 
that has come to take the place of the person.
193
 Butler concludes, using the example of 
hermaphroditism, that ‘there is no gender identity… [and] that identity is performatively 
constituted’.194  This being the case, and the construction being a production of the existing 
power matrix, there is no before, outside, or beyond gender or sexuality, and it must be 
reconstructed within the existing power matrix.
195
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2(3) Chapter 2: Prohibition, Psychoanalysis and the Production of the Heterosexual 
Matrix. 
 
Feminist theory has looked to a pre-patriarchal era to situate a critique of the history of 
women’s oppression.196  This has caused debates about whether there was a pre-patriarchal 
culture, essentially seeking a beginning of the patriarchy to infer that there can also be an end. 
In doing so, however, the notion of ‘patriarchy’ threatens to impose a cultural homogeneity197 
which legitimates the legal system of control which produced it. For Butler, this is politically 
problematic.
198
  Butler questions whether those who try to locate the commencement of the 
gender hierarchy rely on pre-suppositional fictions with problematic norms.
199
  Chapter two 
is essentially a complex review of psychoanalytic and anthropological theories of sex and 
gender which contribute to Butler’s argument that universality is fictional, gender is 
relational and identity performative.  
2(3)(a) Structuralism’s Critical Exchange. 
 
Butler begins her review by looking at the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, who claims that all 
systems of kinship are characterised by a system of exchange where women are the 
currency.
200
  In The Elementary Structures of Kinship
201
 he claims that the bride both 
facilitates trade and consolidates bonds between men.
202
 Women have no identity and instead 
reflect the masculinity
203
 that uses them as bills of exchange to differentiate and bind the 
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homosocial
204
 masculine identity.
205
 Lévi-Strauss links the masculine identity to the incest 
taboo which bars the son from a sexual relationship with the mother, creating a kinship 
relationship between them instead.  The incest taboo bars the daughter from both the father 
and mother, forcing maternity upon her to perpetuate this kinship.
206
  Lévi-Strauss  claims 
that the taboo generates exogamic heterosexuality upon the rejection of the parent as a sexual 
object.
207
   
For Butler, Lévi-Strauss’ universal masculine sexual agency and heterosexuality are 
the foundational fictions on which he constructs his theory, but is unable to account for.
208
  
She questions the universality of the subordinate identity of women as well as the exchange 
economy that is at the core of his theory.
209
  Further, she identifies that there is an identity-in-
difference between the men making the exchange
210
 but nothing that indicates what 
mechanisms differentiate the sexes.
211
  The relational aspect of gender that Butler identifies is 
unstated when applied to this exchange economy: it is pre-supposed, but exists only between 
men.
212
  Levi-Straus explains this presupposition by stating that women must have been 
required to become objects of exchange.
213
 Butler dismisses this as anthropologically 
undocumented, but if true it simply proves that gender is performative as women have had to 
become something that they were not to begin with.
214
  Finally, Butler rejects the incest 
taboo, the apparent birthplace of male heterosexual desire, as Levi-Straus is unable to identify 
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its historic roots.  Significantly for queer theory, she identifies that heterosexuality, like 
masculine sexual agency, is presumed but not accounted for.
215
  
2(3)(b) Lacan, Riviere and the Strategies of Masquerade 
 
How is it possible to ‘be’ a man or a woman, without first asking how we come to ‘be’ 
anything? Jacques Lacan
216
 does not believe it is possible to establish the former without 
asking the latter. By asking how the method of ‘being’ was instituted in a paternalistic 
economy, it is revealed to be pre-ontological.
217
  With the law using pre-suppositional sexual 
difference as a grounding mechanism, ‘being’ and ‘having’ become linguistically divergent 
positions.
 218
   ‘Being’ and ‘having’ the phallus illustrate this divergence.  Women, unable to 
have the phallus, must become the phallus, and this reflective ‘being’ is powerful in so far as, 
without the reflection, ‘having’ the phallus would be meaningless, meaning that women 
‘must become what men are not.’219  
Butler believes that Lacan’s theory is based on the presupposition that ‘being’ is 
always effected via a signifier, in Lacan’s case, the penis.  ‘Having’ and ‘being’ are 
interdependent and mutually exclusive, and, when grounded in reality, are revealed as 
incommensurable.  Who decided what was signified and what was the signifier?
220
  Lacan 
states that the masculine identity gives the appearance that it originates meaning and requires 
women to reflect this illusion to give it foundation.
221
  She does this through masquerade,
222
 
suggesting that all ‘being’ is a masquerade and that there is a ‘being’ prior to the masquerade 
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hidden behind a performative production.
223
  It begs the question of what is being masked.   
Lacan claims that the purpose of the masquerade is to resolve the refusal of love, and he 
locates female homosexuality in this disappointment, although Butler is clearly suspicious of 
his claim, stating that lesbianism is a refusal of sexuality only in so far as sexuality is 
presumed to be heterosexual.
224
 
Joan Riviere also identifies that femininity is a mask.  In ‘Womanliness as a 
Masquerade’225 she views the mask as a method of conflict resolution,226 with the aim of the 
acquisition of the attributes of sexuality being to supress anxiety, with homosexuals 
exaggerating their ‘heterosexuality’ as an internal disguise against their homosexuality.227 
Butler isn’t clear about what attributes are exaggerated, suggesting that it may be that gay 
men may simply not appear that different to their heterosexual counterparts.
228
  Lacan might 
argue this is a gay man attempting to ‘have’ the phallus,229 or a gay woman renouncing the 
‘having’ of the phallus to avoid the condemnation of those whom she must have ‘castrated’ to 
obtain it.
230
 Femininity and male homosexuality are analogous in so far as they are both 
attempts at masquerade - femininity, the mask of a woman who wishes for masculinity and 
the masculinity of the male homosexual a mask seeking to hide (from himself) his 
femininity.
231
  This does not, however, explain female homosexuality which Riviere 
considers to be asexual in nature.
232
  Riviere believes that lesbians seek recognition from men 
that they are equals (or as she puts it, they seek to be recognised as ‘men’ themselves)233 
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without homosexual desire; in other words, lesbians sustain a masculine identification to 
enable them to engage in public discourse on a level playing field with men whilst avoiding 
sexual exchange economy;
234
 a lesbian is a female homosexual, without homosexuality.
235
  
Riviere considers masquerade to be central to ‘womanliness’ and draws no distinction 
between the masked and unmasked woman.
236
 
2(3)(c) Freud and the Melancholia of Gender 
 
Butler moves from anthropology to psychoanalysis with her review of Freud who, like Lévi-
Strauss, locates gender within the Oedipal incest taboo. Freud argues 
237
 that to cope with loss 
of a person we have loved, we incorporate them this into our ego through acts of imitation, 
retaining some of their attributes as a way of retaining them.
238
 This is relevant for gender 
formation as the incest taboo means we lose a love when we must deny our mother or father 
as objects of sexual desire.  If the object of our denial is of the opposite sex, we reject the 
object, but not the desire – we turn our desire to other desirable objects of the opposite sex.239 
If the object we deny is homosexual in nature, we deny both the object and modality of desire 
due to the homosexuality taboo.
240
   
Freud argues that Oedipal complex shapes gender identity is either a positive (same-
sex identification) or negative (opposite-sex identification) way.  The loss of the parent we 
desire results in either an identification with the object of loss, consolidating their masculinity 
or femininity into our ego, resulting in homosexuality, or deflection of the aim of the object, 
resulting in heterosexuality. the mother results in the object of our desire being transformed 
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into desire for either the opposite or same sex via the renouncing of either, or both, the aim 
and the object of our desire.
241
  Freud seems to suggest that, for women, the transformation of 
this melancholia into desire will depend on how masculine or feminine the disposition of the 
child was initially. Butler suggests that he ‘founders’ here as he does not elaborate on which 
aspects of femininity are dispositional and which are the consequence of identification, or 
indeed, how we identify ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ dispositions at all. Do we presume 
female desire for the father as evidence of femininity just because we start our analysis with a 
presumption of a heterosexual matrix of desire, and is bisexuality simply two heterosexual 
desires contained within a single psyche?
242
  The construction of our ego, which has absorbed 
this melancholia as a survival mechanism, also involves the internalisation of gender 
identity.
243
  This serves to reinforce taboos and consolidate identity through the ‘rechanneling 
and sublimation of desire’ whilst regulating and determining masculine and feminine gender 
identification.  Essentially, this  means that gender identification is a melancholia of 
internalised sexual prohibition.
244
   
Gender identification is an internalised melancholia in which the sex of the prohibited 
object is internalised as a prohibition; this sanctions and regulates gender identity and 
heterosexual desire.  The resolution of the Oedipal complex is also responsible for the 
regulation of not only the incest taboo, but also, prior to this resolution,  the taboo against 
homosexuality; resulting in one identifying with the same-sex love object and internalising 
both the aim and object of desire.
245
  Indeed, Butler considers that the taboo against 
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homosexuality precedes the taboo over heterosexual incest, meaning that the homosexuality 
taboo creates the heterosexual disposition resulting in the Oedipal conflict.
246
  
From Freud’s work in this area, Butler extracts the position that the incest taboo, presumed 
by Freud to be primary, is in fact secondary to the homosexual taboo and is ultimately an 
effect of the law.
247
 Dispositions are a result of enforced sexual prohibitions,
248
 and what 
becomes clear is that the dispositions are acquisitions prompted by attempts to adhere to these 
laws.  In both gender and sexuality, Freud exposes that we take on our expected roles and 
perform as required. 
2(3)(d) Gender Complexity and the Limits of Identification 
 
Butler suggests that her review of psychoanalytic problems of identification differs from the 
usual critiques of this field in as much as she has strayed from the usual focus on the 
maternal, which often only reinforces the binary heterosexist framework.
249
  She suggests that 
multiple coexisting identifications produce conflicts and convergences which challenge the 
binary masculine / feminine placements with respect to the paternal law.
250
 This multiplicity 
of identities suggests that the law is not deterministic or even a singular entity.
251
 Butler 
identifies that recourse to paternalistic law as a universal foundation for identity is a 
fantasy.
252
 We should reconsider identity without this fiction, whilst offering a schematic of 
where it conforms or flouts culturally imposed standards of gender identity.
253
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If identity can be subversive as well as compliant, where do we locate the loss?  
Shaffer, 
254
 Torok and Abraham
255
 argue that incorporation of this loss into an interior 
‘psychic’ space is a fantasy in as much as the interior space is ‘created.’256  Gender identity 
considered as a melancholic structure incorporates the loss of the pleasurable object, and 
Irigary argues that Freud’s articulation of melancholy and the development of femininity are 
similar and a psychoanalytic norm for women.  She refutes this and Butler agrees with her. 
 
2(3)(e) Reformulation of Prohibition as Power 
 
The influence of Foucault’s critique of foundationalism is evident throughout Butler’s 
critique of psychoanalysis and anthropological attempts to locate our gender, sex and 
sexuality within an essentialist framework.
257
  Feminist theorists have been attracted to the 
psychoanalytic accounts of gender difference as they locate the primary constructions of 
gender as Oedipal and pre-Oedipal.
258
   Foucault believes that the law creates the very thing 
that it prohibits.  Is it then possible to recast the prohibition against incest as productive, 
rather than prohibitive?  If we are able to do so, then ‘the prohibition that founds the 
‘subject’…becomes the means by which…gender identity is constituted’.259   
Rubin
260
 believes that the incest taboo produces our categories of permitted and 
prohibited sexual partners, ensuring that kinship groups are preserved by exogamic 
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heterosexuality.
261
  She maintains that prior to this transformation from a biological male or 
female, into a gendered man or woman, each child contains all of the sexual possibilities 
available to human expression.
262
  This primary polymorphousness implies that the law 
follows sexuality, in contrast to a Foucauldian analysis which, when applied to the incest 
taboo, shows that it produces both exogamic heterosexuality and transgressive 
homosexuality.
263
  Homosexuality and heterosexuality are effects of the law, as is the illusion 
of any extant sexuality that appears to pre-exist the law.
264
 
Rubin believes that the law transforms sex into gender, placing the acquirer of the 
gender in an apparent position of knowledge – they must know the pre-legal and post-legal 
even although they exist, linguistically and temporally, in an era after the law.
265
  Butler does 
not accept this possibility as the description of the ‘before’ takes place within the context of 
the ‘after’ – the law colours any interpretation of an era before the law.266  Butler cannot see 
how Rubin is able to access a pre-legal era to conclude that the destruction of compulsory 
heterosexuality would de-gender our bodies.
267
   
An acceptance of Foucauldian criticism of the viability of knowing the ‘before’ shows 
that the incest taboo is a product of the law, an emanation of power.
268
  The universality of 
the incest taboo does not mean that it is necessarily the same across cultures, but simply that 
it exists somewhere in every social form.
269
  Butler argues that what the taboo does is forbid 
and dictate sexuality in one form, and produces it in another. The law that prohibits 
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incestuous unions at the same time invites those unions.
270
  In doing so, the production of 
heterosexuality and gender identities require the prohibition of homosexuality.  Bisexuality 
and homosexuality are, psychoanalytically, primary libidinal positions, with heterosexuality 
the produced construction based on their repression; heterosexuality has no pre-cultural 
status.
271
 
2(4) Chapter 3: Subversive Bodily Acts Introduction: 
 
Chapter three further develops Butler’s assertion of the performativity of gender.  She rejects 
universal maternalism as a product of the same discourse that is challenged as oppressive to 
women in the first place.  She also rejects the claims that homosexuality produces ‘non-
identity’, or is a rejection of the ‘real’, arguing instead that identity ought to be appropriated, 
recast and redeployed, rather than rejected.  Finally, by analysing the performative 
complexity of drag, Butler shows that gender is in many ways, simply a drag performance. 
 
2(4)(a) The Body Politics of Julia Kristeva 
 
Butler commences chapter 3 by reviewing the work of Julia Kristeva
272
 and her engagement 
with Lacan’s theory of language. Kristeva challenges Lacan’s presumption that cultural 
meaning requires repudiation of the maternal body.  She does so by arguing that there is a 
space for ‘semiotic’ language as well as the symbolic language to which Lacan exclusively 
attached cultural significance.  
                                                          
270
 Butler, Gender Trouble 97 
271
 Butler, Gender Trouble 98 
272
 Julia Kristeva, The Body Politics of Julia Kristeva French Feminist Philosophy Vol. 3, No. 3, Winter 1989, 104-
118 
0905414G 45 
For Foucault, only discourse determines ‘sex’273 meaning that the ‘maternal libidinal 
economy’ is essentially a production of the historic organisation of sexuality.  Kristeva 
believes the law to be an exclusively prohibitive entity whereas Foucault and Butler believe 
that it is also productive; by not engaging in the productive element of the law, Kristeva does 
not identify that sex is a product of this productive element of the paternal law where the 
agency and object of repression are facets of the same entity.
274
  
2(4)(b) Foucault, Herculine and the Politics of Sexual Discontinuity 
 
For Foucault, sexuality is a locus of power and he argues in The History of Sexuality: Volume 
One that sex is a production of the regulation of sexuality.
275
  Sex is an effect of this 
regulation, rather than the origin, and ‘sexuality’ is a system of discourse that produces sex 
and perpetuates power relations.
276
  Sex must therefore be reconceptualised within sexuality, 
which, like Butler, he states is nothing more than a social construction.  Foucault disavows 
the emancipatory models of sexuality as he does not believe that they deconstruct the sexed 
body which is a historic production of power relations.
277
  The category of sex is regulative 
and any critique which accepts the categorisation as pre-suppositional uncritically legitimates 
the power/knowledge regime
278
 although Butler believes that his own theory maintains an 
emancipatory ideal that his own critical apparatus would suggest is not possible.
279
 
Foucault in some ways contradicted his theory of sexuality offered in The History of 
Sexuality Volume One in a short introduction he wrote to the journals of a nineteenth century 
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French hermaphrodite, Herculine Barbin.
280
  Foucault believes that Herculine’s 
hermaphroditic body exposes the regulatory strategies of sexual categorisation 
281
 revealing 
the disconnect between sex and function –i.e. our activities are not dictated by our gender.  
He believes that Herculine is essentially sexless and that prior to h/er exposure as a 
hermaphrodite s/he was free of the juridical dictat of gender performativity.  It is difficult to 
see how Foucault is able to square this apparent emancipation discourse from his own theory 
in The History of Sexuality: Volume One.  
Herculine’s position is comparable with the discourse that produces female 
homosexuality, although it is equally tempting to categorise Herculine’s attraction to women 
as a masculine orientation as a result of h/er penis.
282
  Foucault believes that Herculine had an 
idyllic existence prior to the enforcement of a singular sexual identity upon h/er, 
283
 Butler 
believes that he sees h/er happiness as contingent on h/er life within the homosexual 
environment.
284
  Butler suggests that perhaps Foucault wants to ‘have it both ways’ – 
suggesting that homosexuality produces non-identity and is instrumental in overthrowing the 
category of sex.
285
  Herculine’s own account of h/er sexual conquests do not support 
Foucault’s interpretation.  S/he participates in the categories Foucault would have h/er 
excluded from and h/er anatomical difference allows her to ‘rearrange’ sex in a way that 
challenges the differences between heterosexual and lesbian exchange, demonstrating 
convergence rather than separation.
286
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Foucault’s contention that homosexual contexts produce sexual non-identity has a 
corollary of contending that heterosexual contexts produce sexual identity.
287
  With identity 
for Foucault an instrument of the regulatory regime, it is unclear whether that regulation is 
reproductive, heterosexual, or something else.
288
  If homosexuality produces non-identity 
then it does not rely on identities being alike and could no longer be described as 
homosexuality.
289
 
Herculine is, in many ways, the embodiment of Butler’s theory of gender 
performativity.  Whilst for Foucault s/he has no identity before one is forced upon h/er, 
Butler correctly identifies that this essentially ignores his own theory on the productive 
element of the law.  Everything about Herculine’s life is, in essence, a gender performance.  
H/er life before sexual singularity is forced upon h/er is an oppositional relation of the sex 
s/he was ultimately legally forced to become; however, even this relation is a performance 
and needs the other for its existence.  Foucault cast Herculine as living a life of bucolic 
innocence before tragedy befell h/er; Butler disagrees.  Herculine was never ‘outside of the 
law’ in the way Foucault contends.290 
2(4)(c) Monique Wittig: Bodily Disintegration and Fictive Sex 
 
Wittig
291
 believes that sex is a political manifestation of reproductive sexuality, the only 
reason, she believes, for the binary division.
292
  She echoes De Beauvoir’s claim that ‘one is 
not born a woman’293 raising questions about what one was before ‘becoming’.294  Sex and 
gender are synonymous, with sex simply a gendered category.  Wittig’s second claim is that a 
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lesbian is not a woman as a woman only exists as a term to stabilize and consolidate the 
oppositional relation to a man, that relation being inherently heterosexual.
295
  In refusing 
heterosexuality, a lesbian is no longer definable within the oppositional relation; she is 
neither male nor female, she is ‘sexless’.296  For Wittig, as well as becoming a woman, one 
can clearly choose not to become a woman, or a man.
297
 
Wittig argues that linguistically, the labelling of sex supports the operation of 
compulsory heterosexuality, a relation which is not reciprocal or binary in the usually 
understood sense.  ‘Sex’ is always female, and males are never sexed, as to be sexed is 
relational and the male is a universal person.
298
  Sex is discursively produced and is 
oppressive to women, gays and lesbians and, for Wittig, incapable of reformation and 
therefore in need of destruction.
299
   Naming the sexes is an act of domination, an 
‘institutionalized performative’300 which compels us to conform to that which has been forced 
upon us – the category compels the social assimilation and is a political category rather than a 
natural fact.
301
 
Wittig believes that only by becoming lesbian or gay can the downfall of presumed 
heterosexuality occur; this involves refuting heterosexuality as it is essentially an all-
encompassing oppressive regime, meaning radical conformity or radical revolution – in other 
words it is all or nothing.
302
  Not everyone agrees with Wittig and Butler does not accept that 
there is a radical disjunction between heterosexuality and homosexuality as both heterosexual 
and homosexual relationships share structures.
303
  Butler concedes that compulsory 
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heterosexuality operates ‘with the force and violence’ 304 that Wittig articulates, but Butler 
does not believe this to be its only modus operandi.   
Wittig believes that being lesbian or gay means that you no longer ‘know’ your sex 
and that you muddy the waters of the categorisation to the point where it is impossible to 
categorise.
305
  Butler does not believe this to be as emancipatory as it sounds as it silences 
discourse within LGBTQ culture that articulates specifically gay identities by appropriating, 
redeploying and parodying the categories of sex.
306
  The refusal of these categories negates 
the reclamation of the terminology by LGBTQ, and the destabilizing effect they have on the 
categories of sex.
307
  For Butler, even if Wittig is right and lesbianism is a refusal of 
heterosexuality, even the refusal is an engagement with the category, dependent on the 
terminology it purports to transcend.
308
  If sexuality and power are coextensive, lesbianism is 
no more or less constructed than any other sexuality. 
For Wittig, becoming a lesbian, rather than de Beauvoir’s woman, suggests no 
solidarity between heterosexual woman and lesbians.  ‘Becoming’ a lesbian is a conscious 
act, a refutation of heterosexuality and sexual binarism.  But what qualifies as a lesbian?  Are 
you lesbian if you reject the disjunction between hetero and homosexual economies?
309
  Do 
other conscious acts qualify as foundational? Can lesbian sexuality be understood as a 
contestation of lesbianism as well as of the categories of ‘sex’ and ‘women’?  Wittig suggests 
that there is a ‘necessary relationship between figurative language and the homosexual point 
of view’310 as homosexuality challenges ‘the real’ via syntax and semantics as they are 
outside of ‘the real’ which they understand to be exclusory.  Butler therefore considers it a 
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mistake to construct gay/lesbian identity in the same exclusory way as it institutes the 
dependence that is seeks to overthrow.  Lesbianism by Wittig’s definition would require 
heterosexuality as it defines itself by the exclusion of it and in doing so denies itself the 
opportunity to redefine the constructs by which it is constituted.  For Butler it would be more 
effective to appropriate and redeploy the categories of identity, not merely to contest them, 
articulating a convergence of multiple discourses and rendering ‘sex’ as an identity 
permanently problematic.
311
  
2(4)(e) Bodily Inscriptions, Performative Subversions 
 
Is there a political shape to ‘women’, articulable prior to the political and epistemic point of 
view?
312
  The sex/gender distinction and the category of ‘sex’ presupposes a generalisation 
already in existence prior to the acquisition of the sexed body, appearing as a passive, 
culturally sourced entity.  The construct of ‘the body’ must itself be questioned in this 
theory.
313
  Wittig suggests that a pre-existing, culturally specific epistemology establishes the 
‘naturalness of sex’.314 Foucault considers the body as a tablet on which cultural inscriptions 
are inscribed. 
315
 That cultural inscription is continuous also infers that there is a body prior to 
the commencement of inscription.
316
 
Mary Douglas in Purity and Danger
317
 suggests ‘the body’ is established through 
cultural codes defining what our ‘bodies’ are and are not.318  The punishment of transgression 
has, as its function, the imposition of compliance and the avoidance of ‘pollution’ of the body 
where the ‘polluter’ is always in the wrong.  The HIV crisis in the gay community is a 
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contemporary construction of this pollution problem although homosexuality constitutes a 
pollution regardless of the presence of HIV, evidenced by lesbian body also being a pollutant 
despite the low-risk of HIV – the sexually transgressive act is the polluter as it reforms the 
body along different cultural lines.
319
 
2(4)(f) From Interiority to Gender Performatives 
 
If gender is truly a construction, inscribed on our bodies, then it can be neither true nor 
false.
320
  Esther Newton in Mother Camp: Female Impersonators in America
321
 suggests that 
impersonation reveals the mechanisms of fabrication and that drag subverts the distinction 
between the inner and outer space, effectively mocking both the expressive model of gender 
and the notion of true gender identity.
322
  Drag is a double inversion, showing appearance as 
an illusion that states that the outside can be feminine and the inside masculine, but also the 
opposite.
323
  This contradictory claim displaces gender signification, and, despite feminist 
critique that drag is degrading to women, Butler believes that the complexity of the 
performance shows the contingent dimensions of corporeality – anatomical sex, gender 
identity and gender performativity.
324
  Sex and gender are denaturalised by performance.  The 
parody assumes no original and instead parodies the very notion of originality exposing the 
fallacy of naturalised or essentialist gender identities,
325
 revealing that the original was indeed 
derived.
326
 
How do we understand the gendered body in these circumstances?  Butler suggests 
that gender must be considered a corporeal style, an act, a performance where the 
                                                          
319
 Butler, Gender Trouble 168 
320
 Butler, Gender Trouble 174 
321
 Esther Newton in Mother Camp: Female Impersonators in America University of Chicago Press (Phoenix Ed 
edition) (1979) 
322
 Butler, Gender Trouble 174 
323
 Butler, Gender Trouble 174 
324
 Butler, Gender Trouble 175 
325
 Butler, Gender Trouble 175 
326
 Butler, Gender Trouble 176 
0905414G 52 
performative aspect suggests construction and meaning,
327
Without the construction and 
performance, there would be no gender at all.
328
  Gender is unstable in terms of its locus as a 
productive entity and must instead be understood as a socially temporal illusion.
329
 Gender 
cannot be internalized as a norm as the ‘internal’ is a surface signification and gender norms 
are a fantasy. 
If gender attributes are performative rather than expressive they constitute the identity 
they express.  The distinction between ‘expression’ and ‘performance’ is crucial – 
performativity infers no pre-existing identity, no true or false, no real or unreal.  Its creation 
via performativity demonstrates that notions of essential sex, of masculinity and femininity 
are part of the strategy of concealment of this performativity. 
 
2(5): From Parody to Politics 
 
Is an identity necessary for identity politics to succeed?  In terms of feminism, the category 
appears, on reflection, to be phantasmic, restrictive, and capable of locating agency only in a 
pre-discursive ‘I’.  The identities used as foundational in feminist politics constrain feminism 
from achieving its set goals.  For Butler, identity politics can succeed without this if we 
accept that all of our gendered identities are simply performance; we are all in drag.  
 
 
2(6): Conclusions for Queer Theory 
 
Butler exposes and confirms what Foucault identified in The History of Sexuality Volume 
One: The Will to Knowledge.  Gender, instead of sexuality, is the locus of her enquiry, 
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although she establishes that both sexuality and gender are two sides of the same coin.  They 
reflect one another, and have been used as a method of control.  Both are products of 
discourse, and, significantly for queer theory, both are artificial social constructions.   
Butler shows that by universalising the category of ‘women’, we impose a structure 
that is not necessarily present.  By doing so we de-legitimise the context within which some 
women experience their personhood.  By universalising women as a single hegemonic 
subject, the binary is reinforced permitting only two gendered categories.  Furthermore, 
Butler shows that not only is gender a cultural imposition, but that sex is no more than a 
relational gendered category, and also artificial.  Both sex and gender form the core of our 
identity, which is simply a performative construction, a product of the system that produces 
us as gendered subjects for the purposes of control and regulation.  We cannot escape gender, 
cannot refuse to perform, and Butler is not convinced that our identity would exist at all 
without gender. It should be noted that in the second edition of Gender Trouble, Butler 
somewhat revises her totally negative interpretation of universality.  Universality is itself 
productive when strategically used as a non-prescriptive, open ended category.  If future 
oriented,
330
 it can produce the reality it claims to represent, and therefore is of some benefit to 
sexual minorities that proclaim it proleptically.
331
 
Butler continues to expose the artificiality of gendered bodies in her analysis of the 
works of Lacan, Lévi-Strauss and Freud.  She demonstrates that, whilst significant, their 
investigations into gender have become hegemonic in terms of feminist theory.  In seeking to 
establish a feminine universality, the relational aspect of gender is ignored, the gender binary 
is reinforced, and heterosexism is entrenched.  Butler does not believe that an adequate 
analysis is given of gay and lesbian identities within this framework, and when further 
                                                          
330
 Butler, Gender Trouble xviii 
331
 Butler, Gender Trouble xvii 
0905414G 54 
psychoanalytical investigation takes place, what is exposed is the presumption of a pre-
existing sexuality, an essentialist nature, unconstructed by the law.  Butler does not believe 
this is possible as she does not accept that it is possible to know the ‘before’ when viewed 
from the ‘after’.  The incest taboo, the psychoanalytical root of our sexuality, would seem to 
show that polymorphism and homosexuality are our primary states, and that heterosexuality 
is a production of the prohibition of these states; heterosexuality depends on homosexuality 
for its very existence. 
For queer theory, this is significant.  Butler’s analysis here confirms the Foucauldian 
theory of the productivity of the law.  We are not in a position to say whether our sexuality 
existed before the prohibition and controlling mechanisms of the law, and are certainly not 
able to advance the argument that heterosexuality is our essentialist nature.  All we can say 
with any certainty is that all of our sexualities are productions of power and prohibition.  This 
places heterosexuality in an equal position to homosexuality and the other minority 
sexualities.  The denaturalising of heterosexuality removes the presumed superiority of it. 
In his review of the journals of Herculine Barbin, Butler shows that even Foucault 
relies somewhat on sexuality as emancipatory ideal.  She shows that our sexuality, whatever 
that is, is a product of the regulatory regime, despite Foucault’s contention that Herculine was 
outside of the law.  She shows that sex is simply a gendered category and that compulsory 
heterosexuality operates with some of the same relationship structures as homosexuality.  
Refusal to engage with pre-set categories is, in itself, an engagement; the body is simply a 
template on which cultural inscriptions of sex and gender are written. 
Finally, in exploring drag culture, Butler shows that gender is simply a performance.  
Whilst drag may be a performance in an entertainment context, this belies the complexity on 
show.  Drag displaces gender in many ways, denaturalising it and showing gender identity as 
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artificial, and the performance to be all that gender is.  There is no natural gender, no pre-
existing template to be adhered to or subverted and the foundationalism used to justify gender 
identity and any adherent sexuality is simply a fiction.  This anti-foundationalist approach is 
essentially queer. It is a rejection of what is considered the normative gender role, and delinks 
gender from any presumed correlation to sexual activity, sexuality, social expectations, and, 
biological determinism.  Gender is freed from these constraints when viewed as performative. 
The next chapter will focus on critiquing the law on marriage and civil partnership in 
Scotland.  Neither institution is discussed or examined in any great detail in the work of 
Butler and Foucault, however, it seems uncontroversial to state that both marriage and civil 
partnership are products of the discourse on sexuality. It is not the intention of this thesis to 
critique the entirety of the law on marriage and civil partnership from a queer perspective, the 
intention instead is to focus my critique on four main areas.  Firstly, I will explain why the 
concept of marriage is problematic from a queer perspective.  The higher social standing 
afforded to marriage and civil partnership is inherently discriminatory, the law used as the 
tool to ensure this elevated status.  I will follow this by critiquing the current law on gender 
recognition, both generally, and in particular where the law on marriage and civil partnership 
is used as a determinant for the recognition of the seeker of a gender recognition certificate.  I 
will then illustrate how the concept of gender, whilst superficially irrelevant for marriage, 
persists in the insistence of the couple structure, a remnant of the historic heterosexual and 
gender complimentary nature of marriage.  Finally, I will examine religious marriage, asking 
whether the outsourcing of a state function to religious organisations, permitted to 
discriminate on the basis of the gender of the parties to a marriage, is tolerable. 
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3: A Queer analysis of Marriage and Civil Partnership 
 
‘We want the abolition of the institution of the bourgeois nuclear family.  We believe 
that the bourgeois nuclear family perpetuates the false categories of homosexuality 
and heterosexuality by creating sex roles, sex definitions and sexual exploitation.  The 
bourgeois nuclear family as the basic unit of capitalism creates oppressive roles of 
homosexuality and heterosexuality…it is every child’s right to develop in a non-sexist, 
non-racist, non-possessive atmosphere which is the responsibility of everyone, 
including gays, to create’ 
 ‘Third world gay liberation manifesto’ New York Circa 1970332 
 
3(1): Introduction 
 
Both Foucault and Butler demonstrate the weakness, and criticise the essentialist nature of, 
the hegemonic binary when applied to gender, sex, and sexuality.  Foucault shows how 
sexuality has been created as a determinist characteristic in order to exercise power. Butler 
demonstrates that sex and gender are two sides of the same coin – performative constructions 
that bear little scrutiny.  How then does this relate to queer theory, and what significance has 
this had on the law on marriage and civil partnership? 
Both Butler and Foucault expose the creation of artificial binaries to which people are 
presumed to belong, based on their genitalia at birth; even when these genitalia are of 
questionable specificity, a gender has often been imposed.  In the cases of sexuality, gender 
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and sex, both Butler and Foucault show that these three categories coalesce in support of the 
hegemonic binary producing the paradigmatic man and woman, both of whom are presumed 
to complement the other.  Whilst Foucault and Butler acknowledge the existence of the 
paradigm, both also demonstrate that the binary exists simply to support the existing power 
matrix – ‘females’ are defined in opposition to ‘males’, their biological differences are 
viewed as complimentary to the default male biology and their social activities, reactions, 
emotions and interactions are attributed to biologically determined characteristics, ultimately 
supporting a continuation of the male hegemony.   
Foucault shows how sexual activities have been used to create ‘sexuality’ and that this 
in turn has been used to exercise power over us by corralling us into categories against which 
the dominant power can be measured and influenced. He shows that without the ‘perversions’ 
the ‘normal’ cannot exist; heterosexuality as we know it would be nothing without minority 
‘sexualities’ against which to compare it.  Some sexualities are productive, useful, utilitarian, 
others deviant, dangerous and destructive but none of them would exist without the other, and 
all of them are creations of discourse.  Marriage is deployed as an ideal, an aspiration, a 
method of control, and is simply a product of the bio-power discourse. Sexuality and 
marriage are both products of this discourse, deployed to reinforce the binary.   
In light of recent changes to marriage law allowing for same-sex couplings, along 
with the creation and development of civil partnership, it must be asked if marriage and civil 
partnership have become vehicles to destroy the hierarchical binaries, or if whether, despite 
the inclusion of same-sex couples, marriage and civil partnership remain antithetical to a 
queer approach to relationships.  
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3(2) What is Queer? 
 
Queer is whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate and the dominant.
333
 The 
emergence of a queer critique was, and remains, a challenge to the prevalent discourse that 
sex, sexuality and gender are essentialist entities; in many ways, at its core, queer theory 
challenges the categorisation of these characteristics as natural emergences.  Queer theory 
recognises that acceptance of the current binary, and the hierarchical structure therein, is an 
acceptance of the logic of domination – a logic which justifies the subordination of those who 
lack power by those who possess it.
334
  Queer theory, like Foucault’s articulation of power, 
accepts the reality that power is unevenly distributed but possessed by all; it therefore seeks 
to undermine the foundations on which these binaries have been constructed by using this 
power.  The aim is not liberation from power (this is not possible) but resistance to its uneven 
distribution, attempting to more equitably distribute it.   
Queer theory emerged as a challenge to the normative mechanisms used by the state 
to ‘name its sexual subjects’.335 It argues that gender along with both ‘deviant’ and ‘normal’ 
sexual behaviours were social constructs. The social constructivist approach rejects the 
essentialism that Foucault identifies as developing in the late nineteenth century as an illusion 
and a product of the discourse of domination. Essentialism links gender roles, gender identity, 
and sexual orientation within a binary, biologically based, heteronormative gender schema.  
Queer theory rejects this and is in many ways a challenge to feminist theory, as it is a more 
radical challenge to the male hegemony,
336
 challenging as it does traditional masculinity and 
masculine roles by subverting them both socially and sexually.  Queer theory exposes 
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sexuality and gender as relations to the dominant discourse, rather than the entities they are 
purported to be. 
A queer approach to gender rejects the male/ female binary as oppressive to 
transsexuals, intersex and gender non-conforming individuals.  Approaching gender from a 
queer perspective is to reject any determinism placed on gender at birth as oppressive, 
meaning that ‘gender’ can be self-defined or fluid. A queer approach to sexuality rejects the 
intersection of gender and sexuality as deterministic. It also rejects the notion that sexuality is 
binary in terms of homo / heterosexuality as oppressive to other sexualities which do not 
identify with these labels.  Queer theory rejects these binaries because they support the 
essentialist discourse and present heteronormativism as the standard by which every person 
should be measured, but also because central to queer politics is the rejection of state 
regulation of sexuality.
337
 In a legal context, marriage and civil partnership are the state 
regulation of relationships as the de facto norm. 
It is on this basis that marriage, as a social, legal and religious status must therefore be 
evaluated.  Marriage and civil partnership both presume, create and support a number of 
binary statuses.  I will demonstrate that in doing so, they create and support a system that 
bestows privilege on a discriminatory basis, largely based on historic structures that instil 
heteronormativity.  These structures remain, I will argue, weighed down by the persistence of 
the influence of gender complementarianism, and therefore remain problematic from a queer 
perspective.  
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3(3) Queer objections to the social status of marriage 
 
There is a very obvious binary created by the institutions of marriage and civil partnership – 
you are either married or in a civil partnership, or you are not.   Queer critiques of marriage 
have largely focused on marriage as a vehicle by which a privileged class of person is 
created
338
  and through which dominant power forces are exerted by the expectation of 
responsibilities and the endowment of rights.
339
  The very existence of marriage and civil 
partnerships as privileged institutions, along with the legal and financial privileges they 
create, compels compliance and means that only those relationships which ape the 
heteronormative are are worthy of privilege.
340
 There is a refusal in both institutions to 
engage with anything other than ‘coupling’, revealing both marriage and civil partnership to 
be part of  a conservative agenda – the antithesis of queer.341  
 Those who sought inclusion within marriage argued successfully that excluding same-
sex couples from marriage denied them the dignity afforded to opposite sex couples.  
Norrie
342
 and others
343
 argue that the state recognition afforded by marriage is essential to 
ensure that the gay and lesbian identity is demonstrably equal to the heterosexual identity.  
This can be contrasted with Ettlebrick who argues that gay and lesbian identity should be 
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affirmed because of its difference,
 
and contends that same-sex marriage simply creates two 
classes of same-sex relationship – one in which sex is permissible, and one in which it is 
frowned upon.
344
   
Ettlebricks’s argument could be read as a defence of the argument which states that 
marriage is a heterosexual institution.  In many ways, this is exactly what she is saying.  It is 
clear that both of these arguments take a differing perspective of LGBTQI identity, one 
perceiving it as equal, and one different.  It is, however, the discourse on equality which has 
predominated discussion on marriage, rather than Ettlebrick’s more radical acceptance of 
difference.    This equality-led discourse on marriage has been deployed with remarkable 
success, if the measure of success is that same-sex marriages are legally equal to those of 
their opposite-sex counterparts, and more widely that opposite –sex couples are no longer 
seen as superior in the eyes of the law, and society.
345
    
 A number of arguments were used to counter the equality discourse of the proponents 
of same-sex marriage. One of them was that the nature of marriage was immutable, 
universally understood and beyond the power of legislators to alter.
346
  This argument is 
flawed in many ways, both legally and socially.  It ignored the obvious competence of the 
Scottish Parliament to legislate in this area, but further than this, refused to acknowledge that 
marriage has not remained unchanged historically.
347
  Marriage as an institution is a legal 
structure, not a natural phenomenon.  This argument does, however, expose that some view 
marriage as an elevated social or religious status, rather than primarily a legal institution. 
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It was also argued that marriage, be it civil or religious, is an elevated social status 
because of its hetero-exclusivity, and that elevating homosexuality to the same level would 
somehow devalue all marriages.
348
 Norrie
349
 attributes the defence of this argument to those 
who oppose every legal equivalence of non-heterosexual behaviours and relationships and 
turns their ‘marriage as a message’ argument against them as the very justification for 
allowing same-sex marriage.  Marriage does represent the equivalence of hetero and 
homosexual relationships, and same-sex marriage is necessary for that reason. 
These and other objections, largely rooted in theologically based objections to same-
sex relationships generally, are easily dismissible in a legal context when the prevailing 
discourse, as it has been, is one of formal equality. However, what these equality-led 
arguments fail to do is to critique the basis for these arguments in the first place, that 
marriage is held to be a relationship above all others and the standard by which all other 
relationships are measured.  The equality argument fails to engage with the fundamental 
reality that marriage creates inequality.  
Butler herself has conceded that if marriage is to exist, then it should be open to all.
350
  
She notes however that same-sex marriage could be perceived as a triumph of the 
conservative agenda, with non-conforming relationship and kinship structures further 
marginalized and othered.
351
  She accepts the validity of the equality agenda, whilst 
articulating the danger it may herald for queer relationships.  All of the arguments against 
same-sex marriage defend the privileged status of marriage; none of the counter arguments 
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critique this status in anyway, and simply request access to the privileged class.  Queer 
influence, I would suggest, is therefore minor.   
Warner argues
352
 that it is the discriminatory endowment of rights and responsibilities 
and elevated social status at the expense of others that those who opposed same-sex marriage 
seek to protect.  I would argue that the social elevation of one group can only be achieved by 
the diminishment of others, and therefore, without the discrimination that is at the heart of 
both marriage and civil partnership, both institutions would lose the value they possess.  
Marriage and civil partnership are celebrated because they are discriminatory.   
 The presumption that one relationship should stand above all others, indeed should 
exist at the expense of others for validation, exposes the queer problem with the social status 
afforded to marriage.  When we ennoble marriage as a society, elevating it to the status of the 
premier relationship type and the standard against which other relationships must be 
measured,
353
 we devalue every other relationship 
354
 and directly or indirectly oppress it.   
Butler argues that by looking to the state to validate our relationships we allow for the 
continuation of state hierarchical control.
355
  By seeking marriage or civil partnership, we 
essentially allow the state to dictate which relationships are valuable, and which are not.  In 
Foucauldian terms, marriage is a product of the discourse on sexuality, and the attached 
benefits are an enticement to comply. The extension of these benefits to another privileged 
group does nothing to resist the deployment of state power in this area overall; if anything, 
same-sex marriage is an example of capitulation, rather than resistance – it does not distribute 
power more equitably, the state simply asserts its power against a larger group of individuals.  
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The extension of marriage to same-sex couples, and the creation of civil partnerships, are 
both simply further emanations of state control and in queer theory terms, should be resisted 
for that reason alone.  If queer discourse has influenced the social status of marriage in any 
way, I would argue it is discernable only in so far as queer discourse influenced an increasing 
acceptance of same-sex relationships as morally equivalent to opposite-sex relationships. In 
terms of the influence on the binary social status created by marriage and civil partnership, 
queer theory has had no influence. 
The elevated status attained by being in a recognised legal relationship is only one 
aspect of both marriage and civil partnership.  I will now show how gender and 
heteronormativism persist within marriage and civil partnership law via the use of marriage 
law within the Gender Recognition Act 2004, through the insistence on the couple structure 
of both marriage and civil partnership, and through the continuation of religious and belief 
marriage, permitting discrimination against same-sex couples. 
 
3(4) Gender alignment 
 
 
3(4)(1) Marriage, Civil Partnership gender alignment: 
 
There are no longer any restrictions placed upon the gender of parties to a marriage in 
Scotland, although there remains a same-sex requirement for civil partnerships.  Whilst I 
would argue that it was undoubtedly a discourse on equality that predominated when the law 
on marriage in Scotland was changed, it would be dismissive to fail to recognise that this 
equality argument itself has been influenced in some way by queer discourse.  The rejection 
of biological and social determinism in relation to gender or sexuality has at its core an 
argument for equality-in-difference and it seems fair to argue in that case that queer theory 
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has influenced the acceptance of an alternative lifestyle to the heterosexual as deserving of 
the legal recognition that marriage brings.  Is there anything to critique, then, about the 
gender of the parties involved in a marriage or civil partnership?   
One area where I would suggest there is still development in gender discourse, 
particularly in relation to marriage and civil partnership is the philosophical underpinning, 
and the legal provisions, of the Gender Recognition Act 2004.  This Act, although primarily a 
vehicle for gender alignment has significant cross over with the law on marriage and civil 
partnership.  
It should be noted that the Scottish Government has given a manifesto commitment to 
review and reform gender recognition law, to ensure it is in line with international best 
practice for people who are transgender or intersex.
356
  The proposed changes would legislate 
to allow for self-definition of gender without the need for medical approval, and would, for 
the first time, recognise those who do not identify with the gender binary.
357
  The intention of 
this chapter is therefore to explain and critique the law on gender recognition in so far as it 
currently interfaces with the law on marriage and civil partnership.  The areas I will criticise 
have been identified as problematic, evidence of the continued influence of queer theory in 
this area. 
 
 3(4)(2) Marriage, Civil Partnership and the Gender Recognition Act 2004 
 
As far as marriage is concerned, gender alignment is not as legally problematic for the 
individual, or couple, as it used to be.  Legally, the purpose of completing the gender 
alignment process is to obtain a gender recognition certificate, a document legally aligning 
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the gender of the holder of the certificate with the gender with which they identify; socially, 
this recognition confirms the identity of the holder of a gender recognition certificate.  
In circumstances where one spouse in a marriage transitions from one gender to 
another, prior to the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, it was necessary for 
that marriage to be ended by divorce before a full gender recognition certificate was 
issued.
358
  The rationale for this was that there was, at the time, a prohibition of same-sex 
marriage and by recognising the acquired gender of the party holding the full gender 
recognition certificate, a continuing marriage would essentially mean that people in this 
category would have been legally in a same-sex marriage. The couple could expedite the time 
required between posting the notice and registering their partnership under s88(1)
359
 and 
marry in any of the 30 days that followed the posting of the civil partnership notice.
360
  The 
rationale behind the termination of a marriage on these grounds no longer stands in Scotland 
since same-sex couples can now marry.   
Since the introduction of same-sex marriage, it is now the case that if both parties 
agree, the marriage can continue.  Agreement between the spouses or not, the marriage is 
considered a ‘protected Scottish marriage’361 if the marriage was solemnised in Scotland and 
a ‘protected marriage’362 if solemnised in England, Wales or any jurisdiction outside of the 
UK. The issuance of a full gender recognition certificate will be contingent on the spouse of 
the party seeking the gender recognition certificate stating their agreement for the marriage to 
continue after transition.
363
 If the other criteria unrelated to marriage are met, a full gender 
recognition certificate will be issued.
364
 If the other party to the marriage does not agree to 
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the marriage continuing after the transition,
365
 an interim gender recognition certificate will 
be issued
366
 until the court grants a decree of divorce on the ground that an interim gender 
recognition certificate has been granted.  After this the court will issue a full gender 
recognition certificate.
367
  
In the case of civil partners, the law is similar.  A civil partnership becomes a 
‘protected Scottish civil partnership’368 or ‘protected civil partnership’.369 This protection is 
limited however as the civil partnership will only continue, and a full gender recognition 
certificate will only be issued if the other party to the protected civil partnership or protected 
Scottish civil partnership
370
 has also been issued with a gender recognition certificate.
 371
  If 
only one of the parties sought a gender recognition certificate after registering the civil 
partnership this would result in the dissolution of the civil partnership due to the same-sex 
requirements of civil partnership.
372
  The couple in these circumstances could, of course, 
marry. 
 The general rule for eligibility to marry
373
 or enter a civil partnership
374
 is that both 
parties must be at least 16 years of age. Whilst technically possible to marry at 16 for both 
transsexuals and transgender individuals, it is not possible to obtain a gender recognition 
certificate until at least the age of 18 
375
 and after living in the gender the individual wishes to 
legally acquire for two years.  Essentially, this means that for an individual seeking a gender 
recognition certificate to enable them to marry or enter a civil partnership in the gender they 
wish to acquire, they must be at least 18 to do so. 
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3(4)(3) The Gender Recognition Act 2004 
 
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 was created due to a legal challenge to the gender rules for 
marriage at that time.
376
 Eligibility to marry was determined by the gender assigned to the 
parties at birth, meaning that transsexuals were unable to marry persons of the opposite sex to 
their confirmed gender after surgery.  At that time, any marriage between two persons who 
were the same-sex at birth was void ab initio.
377
  Christine Goodwin challenged this.  
Designated male at birth, at the time of her application to the European Court of Human 
Rights, Christine was a post-operative male-to-female transsexual who wished to marry a 
man.  She was not able to do so as a result of the decision in Corbett v Corbett,
378
 which had 
decided that gender was chromosomal, gonadal, genitally determined at birth and 
unchangeable legally.
379
  Goodwin successfully argued that the prohibition on allowing her to 
change her gender on her birth certificate to recognise her confirmed gender, and her 
resultant  ineligibility to marry a man, was a violation of her Article 8 right to a private and 
family life,
380
 and her Article 12 right to marry,
381
 rights guaranteed under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The European Court found in her favour, and the UK 
government was compelled to legislate to allow her, and other transsexuals, to amend their 
birth certificates to reflect their acquired gender.
382
  Marriage law was not changed or altered, 
the law on gender recognition was.   
                                                          
376
 Christine Goodwin and I v United Kingdom [2002] 2 FCR 577 
377
 Corbett v Corbett [1970] 2 All ER 33  
378
 Corbett v Corbett [1970] 2 All ER 33  
379
 Corbett v Corbett [1970] 2 All ER 33 Ormrod at page 100 
380
 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8 
381
 European Convention on Human Rights Article 12 
382
 Gender Recognition Act 2004 
0905414G 69 
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 has been described as  progressive,
383
 a ‘turning 
point in conventional human rights discourse on gender identity’384 and, indeed, ‘Butlerian’ 
as it replaced the concept of ‘sex’ with that of ‘gender’.385 Critiques of the Act386 however 
recognise that it perpetuates the presumption that transsexualism is a mental illness
387
 known 
as gender dysphoria,
388
 and that gender confirmation, be it surgical or non-surgical, should be 
intended to be a permanent change
389
 with the ultimate aim of surgical alignment if viable.
390
  
So, whilst surgery is not a pre-requisite, at the time considered very progressive,
391
 it is 
presumed to be the intention of the applicant if medically possible. The applicant for a 
Gender Recognition Certificate is also required to have lived in their chosen gender for two 
years
392
  and the agreement of a panel of medical professionals is necessary to allow for the 
gender recognition process to be completed
393
 – self-definition of gender was not, and is not 
currently permissible. 
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 should not be underestimated; allowing transition 
for those who identify with the gender binary is not insignificant and it has surely had a 
positive impact on the approximately 3500 individuals who have gone through gender 
confirmation since 2005.
394
  However, I would suggest that there is a philosophical 
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disconnect between aim of the Act and implementation, particularly if a queer approach is 
taken.   
What the Gender Recognition Act 2004 clearly allows is the legal transition from one 
gender to another.  By allowing for a formal change from one gender to another, there 
appears to be at least an implicit acceptance that that male or femaleness is not necessarily 
correctly designated at birth.
395
 The Act uses the term ‘acquired’ gender to signify the gender 
after the issue of a gender recognition certificate; acquisition is also how De Beauvoir and 
Butler discuss gender –one ‘becomes’ a gender, or more accurately for De Beauvoir, one 
becomes a woman.  Certainly, linguistically the use of the terminology of acquisition seems 
to infer that legislators accepted the social constructivist underpinnings of the concept of 
gender, and I would argue that queer theory has clearly influenced this approach to gender.  
However, despite this, in implementing the Act, the focus remains cosmetically anatomical, 
and the continuation of the pathologising approach to transsexualism remains pervasive. 
The gender of the person seeking a gender recognition certificate is ultimately decided 
by the medical professionals who will agree to issue the certificate, not by the person 
themselves.  This approach to gender confirmation is arguably dehumanising as it removes 
the applicant’s agency to self-identify.   A refusal to issue a certificate leaves the person 
legally the gender they were designated at birth and it must surely be asked how a gender 
recognition certificate could possibly be issued to a person who des not identify with the 
gender binary, but is, none the less, designated ‘gender dysphoric’.  The Act offers no 
engagement with the possibility of non binarism and therefore the gender binary itself 
remains unchallenged by the concept of transition.   Thus far, queer influence seems confined 
to acceptance of change within the gender binary. 
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It is fitting that a legal challenge borne from a desire to marry should result in 
legislation that contains provisions specific to marriage and civil partnership.  At the time of 
the introduction of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, the maintenance of the gender binary 
supported the continuation of the hetero-exclusivity of marriage; indeed, it has been 
suggested that in some ways, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was created for this very 
reason.
396
  This is perhaps revealed in the provisions that required a married applicant for a 
gender recognition certificate to divorce before the issuance of a full gender recognition 
certificate. The ‘divorce / dissolution requirement’ has been criticised397 and as previously 
noted, it is no longer the case in Scotland that all marriages have to end in divorce for the 
issuance of a full gender recognition certificate.  However,  the European Court of Human 
Rights has held that signatory states may indeed require the  dissolution of a marriage before 
allowing the right of legal gender recognition
398
 and it remains the case that those in a civil 
partnership will still generally be required to dissolve this before a full gender recognition 
certificate is issued unless the other party to the civil partnership has also applied for a gender 
recognition certificate. 
399
  
It is conceded that the progressiveness of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 has been 
somewhat overtaken by continued developments and approaches to increasingly visible trans 
and gender issues.   The concept of gender binarism itself is now being criticised more openly 
and recognition is increasingly sought for fluid and non-binary genders.  The Scottish 
Government has, and it should be noted, with little controversy, announced that it plans to 
revisit gender recognition, and that their intention is to recognise non-binary and fluid 
genders.   As the enforcement of binarism is, I would suggest, a major weakness in the 
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legislation and the area in which queer influence is least present, this is welcome.  The 
Gender Recognition Act 2004 has, I would suggest, been historically utilised as a tool for the 
maintenance of the gender binary and the enforcement of gender rules that, despite same-sex 
marriage now being permitted, persist within marriage and civil partnership.   
3(4)(4) Gender of parties to a marriage and civil partnership 
 
Whilst the gender of the parties to a marriage is superficially not relevant in Scotland, it 
appears, on the face of it, that both parties must be either male or female – a binary gender 
designation is still necessary.  This excludes those who are gender non-binary, a legal status 
recognised in a number of countries.
400
  In Scotland, and the rest of the UK, there is 
currently
401
 no legal status for those who are gender non-binary, and therefore, if born in the 
UK, a person self-defining as gender non-binary  would have a binary designation of male or 
female on their birth certificate, allowing them to marry in any case – albeit that they would 
marry with a gender designation that they do not accept as their own.  However, what is 
unclear is whether a person legally designated as a third gender in another jurisdiction would 
be able to marry in Scotland, or if they had married outside of Scotland, if their marriage 
would be valid? 
The statute gives no guidance on whether a third-gendered individual could marry in 
Scotland.  The gender neutrality of the law in terms of capacity, on a reading of the statute 
shows only that same-sex or opposite-sex marriage is permissible; in terms of civil 
partnership, same-sex couplings are all that are allowed.
402
  The statue suggests that to marry 
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in Scotland the gender of either party must at least be defined in line with the binary – this 
would particularly be the case if the wedding was a religious wedding as the religious 
freedom protections put in place depend largely on the gender of the parties to the marriage. 
In a civil partnership, it is certainly the case that the parties must have a defined gender, and 
that the gender must be the same for each party.
403
   
Whether a foreign marriage to a third gender individual would be legally valid in 
Scotland is in the realms of international private law.  In the absence of any specific literature 
or commentary on this area, it is helpful to look to the discussions on the recognition of same-
sex marriages before 2014.  Norrie wrote in 2004
404
 that he believed a Scottish court would 
give effect to the consequences of a Dutch same-sex marriage, despite, same-sex marriage 
not being permitted  in Scotland at that time.
405
 The approach in recognising foreign 
marriages has been that, unless there are public policy concerns against doing so, the court 
has the discretion to accept the validity of the marriage.
406
 In other jurisdictions where same-
sex marriage is not permissible, similar decision have been reached regarding the validity of 
same-sex marriages conducted abroad 
407– legal effect is given to the union to the extent that 
it would be given to an opposite-sex union.  I would argue that it is likely that the marriage of 
a person who is legally defined as a third gender would be given legal effect, if the marriage 
was entered into outside of Scotland; I do not, however, consider that a person legally defined 
as a third gender would necessarily be able to marry in Scotland, and it seems certain that 
they would be unable to enter a civil partnership.  Again, it must be expected that the 
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proposed changes to gender recognition in Scotland will address this as far as marriage is 
concerned.   
I think that it is clear that in terms of gender, queer theory has had some influence.  
The creation of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was undoubtedly the result of a legal 
challenge, however, queer theory has, I would suggest, influenced, and continues to influence 
the societal acceptability of gender alignment and gender identity within, and outwith the 
gender binary.   
Where The Gender Recognition Act 2004 interfaces with the law on marriage and 
civil partnership, I would argue that the Act was, and remains a useful tool in maintaining the 
hetero-exclusivity of marriage, and the homo-exclusivity of civil partnership. It does this 
utilising divorce and dissolution requirements before an applicant can be issued with a full 
gender recognition certificate.  Whilst the divorce requirement has been repealed in Scotland 
in some circumstances, and is increasingly no longer a determinant in other jurisdictions 
where same-sex marriage is permissible,
408
 there will generally be a dissolution requirement 
if the applicant for a gender recognition certificate is in a civil partnership.  The insistence on 
maintaining gender requirements within both institutions was a demonstration of the 
peripheral influence queer theory had on the concept of gender when the Act was created; the 
proposed Scottish Government changes are, I would argue, evidence that queer theory has 
continued to influence the concept of gender. 
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3(5) The influence of gender binarism on parties to a marriage or civil partnership 
 
Gender binarism has, I would argue, had an influence of the structure of marriage and civil 
partnership most clearly evident in the requirement that only two people may be parties to a 
marriage or civil partnership. Sexuality and marriage are both evolutions of what Foucault 
called the device of ‘alliance’. It seems uncontroversial to claim that, certainly in western 
culture, the ‘couple’ structure of marriage has historically developed as an element of the 
essentialist discourse that presumed the complementary
409
 nature of both genders in relation 
to their roles within marriage.  In terms of the law, this presumed complementarianism was 
mirrored when the law on civil partnership was created.   
The insistence that any marriage or civil partnership in Scotland can be constituted 
between only two people is further evidence of state interference within personal 
relationships and is area for criticism from a queer perspective.  Any truly queer union would 
not be so prescriptive.  I would also argue that it is reflective of the historic opposite-sex 
requirements for marriage, mirrored in the structure of civil partnership.  The right of sexual 
minorities to have formalised plural relationships recognised is absent entirely from 
consideration.  
I would argue that plural marriage is generally, and largely justifiably, presented as 
hyper-patriarchal due to the fact that, as practiced, it tends to be polygynous, meaning that 
men can take additional wives, but women can have only one husband.
410
 I think it also 
necessary to acknowledge that there are legitimate concerns that in many circumstances, 
plural marriage is often not truly consensual due to the age, capacity or willingness of the 
parties, usually the female, to the marriage.  The solution, offered without flippancy to the 
                                                          
409
 McK. Norrie Kenneth Now the dust has settled: The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014  
Jur. Rev. 2014, 2, 135-163 at 139 
410
 R Leckey and K Brooks Queer Theory: Law, Culture and Empire Routledge; Reprint edition (2011) at 138 
0905414G 76 
later problem lies, of course, in ensuring consent through strong anti-forced marriage 
legislation.  Hyper-patriarchy is more difficult to legislate against; however, if permitted in 
Scotland, plural marriages would be taking place in a country and culture where gender 
equality is more visible.  In these circumstances, isn’t it possible that more polyandrous 
structures would emerge? 
 Whilst it must be conceded that most people who are in a relationship, whether in 
same-sex or opposite-sex relationships, are in a relationship with a significant other rather 
than significant others,
411
  there are people who choose to live in relationships that are 
polyamorous, involving more than just two people, and who do not do so for religious or 
cultural reasons.    
Historically, the western aversion to plural marriage has its roots in the Christian 
tradition which endows privilege on opposite-sex monogamy.
412
  The often used description 
of marriage from Hyde v Hyde
413
 was, it has been suggested, necessary to distinguish 
monogamous Christian marriage from its polygamous Mormon counterpart.
414
  The use of 
the threat of plural marriage as a defence against same-sex marriage
415
 demonstrates that the 
objections to plural marriage have some of the same roots as objections to same-sex 
marriage, and same-sex relationships in general.  Opponents of change argue that social 
instability will follow, using their position of privilege to supress a minority interest
416
  
despite there being little evidence to support their supposition.   
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From a public policy perspective, I believe that it is irrational to accept that plural 
marriages conducted outside of Scotland should be given legal effect,
417
 whilst, at the same 
time, refusing to allow these marriages to be constituted within Scotland.  The valid concerns 
raised about consent and gender equality would be subject to regulation if plural marriages 
and civil partnerships were subject to the same scrutiny as their monogamous counterparts. If 
the public policy argument is therefore flawed, is there justification for refusing to recognise 
plural marriage and civil partnerships from the perspective of legal complexity? 
The benefits that accrue to a partner on marriage and civil partnership range from 
residency for immigration purposes,
418
 inherited titles and courtesy titles, tax breaks, welfare 
and benefit rights, succession rights where one party dies, and rights in circumstances of 
divorce or dissolution.  The right to benefits, succession rights on the death of a spouse or 
civil partner, or to property rights on divorce or dissolution are the most common encounters 
where marital or civil partnership status may make a difference.  
In a monogamous relationship, in circumstances where one party to a marriage or 
civil partnership dies, the distribution of property in these circumstances is likely, I would 
suggest, to be relatively straightforward, and will follow the law of succession or the rule of 
the court.  It is likely to be the same in most circumstances when couples terminate their 
relationship by divorce or dissolution. However, the lack of specific guidance within the 
legislation on how to distribute property in plural marriage situations is not due to legal 
complexity. 
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 An example of how the UK legal system is able to approach the complexity of plural 
marriages can be seen in the administration of state benefits.  Whilst the UK will accept that 
some people live in plural marriages, the benefit system will not allow the married parties to 
claim as a single unit.
419
  In income related benefit claims, the tendency is that two parties to 
the plural marriage will make a claim as a couple; other parties to the marriage can make 
single claims.  A different regime comes into play however, where access to the contributions 
of a spouse may be relevant.  This usually occurs when a partner dies, leaving the other party 
able to access their contributions as a widow’s benefit.  One might expect that this benefit 
would be distributed equally among the surviving parties to the marriage.  However, instead, 
no surviving party to the marriage is able to access widow’s benefit.420 The rationale for this 
is not that it is complex to do so, but that only those in ‘legally recognised unions’ may 
inherit certain rights.  The European Court of Human Rights has upheld this approach as 
being legitimate and non-discriminatory in favouring monogamy over polygamy.
421
  
 Polygamous rights of succession would be another area where one might expect extra 
complexity when compared to monogamous rights of succession.  There have been a number 
of cases before the English courts which have upheld the rights of surviving spouses in plural 
marriages to make a claim for provision from the estate.
422
  The most recently settled 
approach in cases of intestacy, allots a single spousal portion of the estate to be distributed 
between the surviving spouses, rather than allowing individual spousal claims.
423
  This is to 
                                                          
419
 See submission to DWP 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/221283/submission-to-sos-
091106.pdf accessed September 19 2016  explaining the UK government definition of polygamy and how 
benefits will be calculated in these situations. 
420
 Ibid at point 14 page 3 upheld in Bibi v Chief Adjudication Officer Times, July 10, 1997 (CA) 
421
 CP/3114/2003 (Unreported, November 25, 2005) (SS Comm) cited in Journal of Social Security Law Case 
Comment ‘Widow's benefit - polygamous marriages - discrimination under Art.14’ .S.S.L. 2006, 13(2), D64 
422
 See for example Sehota (deceased) Re [1978] 3 All E.R. 385 where the general principal was affirmed and 
more recently Official Solicitor to the Senior Courts v Yemoh and Others [2010] EWHC 3727 (Ch), [2011] 
1 WLR 1450, [2011] 2 FLR 371  
423
 Official Solicitor to the Senior Courts v Yemoh and Others [2010] EWHC 3727 (Ch), [2011] 1 WLR 1450, 
[2011] 2 FLR 371 
0905414G 79 
avoid the intestate estate being extinguished by spousal claims and leaving no residue for any 
children.  A similar approach in Scotland would allot the prior rights portion of an intestate 
estate to the surviving spouses leaving anything remaining to settle the legal rights of any 
issue. From the perspective of legal complexity, succession law is clearly able to deal with a 
scenario where there is more than one spouse. 
These rights in succession, divorce and dissolution can be contrasted with similar 
rights that the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 introduced for cohabitants when a 
relationship ends due to the death or breakup of the cohabitant relationship.
424
 The law does 
not prohibit anyone from living with, and having romantic relations with as many people as 
they chose although in terms of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, a cohabitant is defined 
as two persons of the same
425
 or opposite sex
426
 living together as though married or in a civil 
partnership.  When considering whether someone is a cohabitant in terms of the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006, the court will consider the length of cohabitation,
427
 the nature of the 
relationship
428
 and the financial arrangements between the parties.
429
  
What I believe is interesting about the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 is that 
nothing in The Act states that a person cannot be in a cohabitant relationship with more that 
one person – for example, Jane cohabits with Jack in Glasgow, but works in Aberdeen where 
she cohabits with Janet.  All parties are aware of and consent to the relationships.  Whilst 
initially it could appear that these relationships would be difficult to define as relationships 
where the parties live together as though married or in a civil partnership, as required by the 
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Act,
430
 it is submitted that nothing in marriage or civil partnership law prevents parties 
agreeing to non-monogamous relationships and that consequently, nothing prevents a 
relationship like Jane, John and Janet’s being defined as a cohabitant relationship in terms of 
the Act.  
 The provisions of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 show that it is possible for the 
law to take an approach where monogamy may not necessarily be the staring point.  The 
approach of the court in these circumstances will be nuanced and specific to the life of the 
parties involved, although it must be said that a determination will be made from outside of 
the relationship on whether the relationship qualifies as a ‘cohabitant’ relationship measured 
against marriage or civil partnership as a starting point.  I would argue however, that the 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 has the potential to bring, in some circumstances, some 
benefits similar to those enjoyed by those in marriages and civil partnerships to those in 
plural relationships.  The potential provision of these benefits demonstrates that the law is 
capable of dealing with non-monogamous relationships and shows that it is therefore not 
impossible legal complexity that prevents plural relationships being given access to marriage 
and civil partnerships with their attendant benefits and responsibilities, but public policy to 
elevate monogamous relationships as the societal and legal norm.   
Marriage and civil partnership remain structurally built around a two-person formulation.  
Despite same-sex marriage and civil partnerships being permitted, validity is still only given 
to those relationships which are analogous to relationships which are structurally based 
around gender essentialist foundations. Although superficially, the gender of the parties to a 
marriage has diminished in importance, once the surface has been breached, it is clear that the 
influence of gender is still relevant in both the structure of marriage, and the restrictions on 
the number of parties to a marriage.  Plural marriage, whilst acceptable in some 
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circumstances in Scotland has not been as a result of queer influence; plural marriages have, I 
would argue, a diminished legal and social status demonstrating that queer theory has not 
influenced the over-riding monogamous expectations of marriage and civil partnership.  A 
refusal to allow plural marriage from a queer perspective, is a refusal to allow people to 
structure their relationships on a basis that suits them alone.  The law the parties to a marriage 
and civil partnership remains decidedly heteronormative.  
   
3(6) Religious and Belief Marriage and Civil Partnership: 
  
Marriage and civil partnership ceremonies in Scotland can be civil or religious in nature.  The 
legal implications for the parties concerned after either ceremony are identical.  It is the 
intention of this final section to explain the law on religious marriage and civil partnership 
ceremonies and demonstrate that whilst equality-led discourse has predominated in the 
marriage equality debate in Scotland, it has proven to be somewhat less effective in ensuring 
that same-sex couples have access to religious marriage.  A clash of rights and persuasive 
discourse from both sides of the argument have meant that religious organisations now have a 
statutory right to discriminate on the basis of the gender of parties to a marriage. Equality-led 
discourse will, I will argue, be ineffective in overcoming this, and only a radical rethink on 
religious marriage which removes the right of religious organisation to legally marry all 
Scottish couples will resolve this issue.  
 
3(6)(1) Religious and belief marriages and civil partnership ceremonies 
 
For some, marriage is a religious sacrament, rather than, or as well as, a civil status.  For 
others, it is a celebration that is borne of their belief in humanism or some other belief 
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system.  The law relating to the celebration of religious or belief marriage ceremonies is 
slightly different to that of civil marriage.  Civil partnership, until recently an institution that 
mirrored civil marriage only, has been modified to include a religious and belief element to 
allow those who wish to have their civil partnership celebrated religiously to do so.  What 
follows will examine the law on celebration of opposite-sex marriage, same-sex marriage and 
registration of civil partnership in a religious or belief context. 
Where a marriage between persons of different sexes is to be formalised in a religious 
marriage ceremony, the marriage may be solemnised by a minister or deacon of the Church 
of Scotland, these ministers or deacons being automatically authorised to carry out mixed-sex 
religious weddings.
431
 It should be noted that the Church of Scotland is not automatically 
authorised to carry out same-sex marriage ceremonies
432
 or religious civil partnership 
ceremonies,
433
 and would have to apply to do so as an organisation.  
A minister, clergyman, pastor, priest, celebrant or someone recognized by other 
religious or belief bodies as being someone entitled to solemnise marriages of people of 
different sexes on their behalf may also seek permission from the Scottish Ministers 
434
 to 
perform religious or belief wedding ceremonies.
435
 These same religious or belief bodies may 
also seek permission to perform same-sex wedding ceremonies,
436
 and/or religious or belief 
civil partnership ceremonies.
437
 The difference between opposite-sex religious and belief 
wedding ceremonies, and same-sex religious and belief wedding and civil partnership 
ceremonies is that the minister, clergyman, pastor, priest, celebrant or other person may not 
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be compelled to perform same-sex marriage
438
 or civil partnership
439
 ceremonies if they 
choose not to do so. Similarly, religious and belief organisations cannot be compelled to opt-
in to perform same sex marriage
440
 and civil partnership
441
 ceremonies.  The provisions state 
that they are for the purpose of clarity and can be contrasted with civil marriage and civil 
partnership where there simply is no opt-in or opt-out procedure for registrars.  The inference 
must be here that religious conviction, however keenly held, is viewed as having no place in 
the administration of a civil function, and indeed, a legal challenge by a registrar in London 
to exempt herself from celebrating civil partnership ceremonies failed, finding that the 
prohibition of discrimination by the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 took 
precedence over any right she would otherwise have by virtue of her religious belief or faith 
to practice discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.
442
 
Scotland differs from many jurisdictions in so far as a religious or belief marriage or 
civil partnership has legal validity.  In other jurisdictions, only the civil marriage ceremony is 
able to legally marry the parties.
443
  A religious wedding ceremony in these countries must be 
preceded or superseded by this civil ceremony if the marriage is to have any legal validity in 
the eyes of the state.  Marriage in these jurisdictions is a state function, a function of law, and 
it is therefore the duty of the state to marry the parties, not their place of worship.  In 
Scotland marriage and civil partnership are state institutions either administered by the state 
alone in the case in civil marriage and civilly registered civil partnership, or outsourced to 
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permitted religious and belief organisations in the case of religious marriage and religious or 
belief civil partnership.   
There are two ways to view the legislative provisions that endow both religious 
organisations and religious celebrants with the right to permit a civil function in a 
discriminatory way.   Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the 
right to believe and manifest one’s religion; the objections to same-sex marriage by religious 
organisations are based on theological justifications and the provisions allowing religious 
organisations and celebrants to refuse to perform same-sex unions is a proportionate way to 
protect their Article 9 rights.  Legal rights aside, it is also arguable that allowing religious 
marriage and civil partnership ceremonies generally is a demonstration of pluralism and 
tolerance and further demonstrates that marriage is a social and religious status, as well as a 
legal status.  This approach has been supported by those who believe that the religious 
protections afforded to religious organisations and celebrants are an appropriate way to 
ensure individual and religious group autonomy.
444
  
There is of course, another way to view these religious protections and that is that 
religious and belief organisations have been given an unjustifiable statutory right to 
discriminate against same-sex couples. Norrie notes that it is peculiar that religious 
organisations are permitted to create an institution with only civil effects in terms of the 
law.
445
  He notes also that it is clear when looking at the position of the Church of Scotland 
within the legislation that it has a ‘special place’,446 in legislative terms, in relation to 
opposite-sex marriage.  Automatically endowed with the right to perform opposite-sex 
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weddings, the lack of this automatic right in relation to same-sex wedding ceremonies 
ensures that the Church of Scotland
447
 is enabled to discriminate against same-sex couples in 
the same way as other religious organisations.  
Fundamentally, I would argue that in allowing a state function to be administered in a 
discriminatory way, the state sanctions and allows for same-sex relationships to be held in 
diminished importance at both a state and social level. By articulating, it is submitted, 
unnecessarily,
448
 that religions and religious celebrants can discriminate on the basis of the 
gender and presumed sexuality of parties to a marriage, the state ultimately sends the 
message that this discrimination is not only permissible legally, but also that it is acceptable 
to hold the view that one marriage has moral value that the other does not.  Same-sex 
relationships have been held to constitute ‘family-life’449 in terms of Article 8 of the ECHR; 
clearly, the state considers that in religious terms, it is acceptable to consider them a 
diminished form of family life. 
It is interesting to contrast religious and belief marriage and civil partnership with 
civil marriage and civilly registered civil partnership.  There are no provisions that allow 
registrars or registration districts to refuse to perform same-sex civil marriages or civil 
partnerships on religious grounds and indeed, it has been held that it is illegal to do so.
450
  It 
must be asked why the religious belief of a registrar is of less importance than the religious 
belief of a celebrant.  Both are performing a state function.  Both are endowing parties with 
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identical rights and responsibilities, and yet, for a registrar, to discriminate in this way would 
certainly mean losing their job.
451
   
I would suggest also that the permission to discriminate in this way actually opens a 
door to a legal challenge.
452
  A religious wedding may be a religious sacrament to those 
participating in it, but it is also the  administration a state function at the same time.  In 
England, a registrar admitted that she would be unable to perform same-sex marriages due to 
her religious belief, and was subsequently sacked; she was later reinstated.
453
  It must be 
stated that this case did not go through the courts, but that the fact that the council reinstated 
the registrar in question raises questions about the certainty the had about achieving a result 
similar to Ladele
454
 where only the administration of civil partnership was considered.  The 
two differing approaches are, I would argue, unjustifiable and create legal uncertainty. 
Is there a queer solution to this disjointed approach to civil and religious marriage and 
civil partnership that the equality agenda has been unable to unify?  I would suggest there is.  
Norrie argues that it will perhaps be only with the complete separation of church and state 
that true marriage equality for same-sex couples will be achieved, meaning that religious 
marriage ceremonies would have to be stripped of any legal validity.
455
  He notes the danger 
in providing for specific legal exemptions in terms of sexuality, sending, as it does,  the 
message that the demands of equality are weaker for this group than for others protected 
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minority groups;
456
 he suggests that only the secularisation of legal personal relationship is 
the solution 
457
 and I would agree. 
In terms of queer influence, it hardly needs stating that religious organisations have 
not been influenced by queer theory.  What is clear, however, is that where religious marriage 
and civil partnership are concerned, queer theory has had no influence on the state approach 
to religious marriage and civil partnership and that opposite-sex marriage remains privileged 
within religious and belief organisations. 
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4 Conclusion: 
 
Marriage is an institution that, for many queer theorists, has historically been the locus of 
oppression for LGBTQI people.  In many ways, the queer approach to relationships was 
antithetical to marriage and the creation of civil partnerships; both institutions continue to 
emanate a patriarchal state power which dictates how personal relationships should be 
structured and which simply reflect heteronormativity.  The purpose of this thesis was, 
however, not to establish if marriage and civil partnership are queer institutions, but to 
establish if these institutions had been influenced in any way by queer theory. 
On a social level, a queer critique of marriage and civil partnerships would focus on 
the social privilege of these institutions.  Same-sex marriage has done nothing to ameliorate 
this privilege, and has instead, dispersed this privilege to a wider social group, rather than to 
all.  Queer influence has been peripheral, if present at all, and marriage and civil partnership 
have remained institutions that privilege those willing to submit to prescriptive structures.   
Foucault and Butler both exposed the artificiality of our gender and sexuality.  What 
is clear, however, is that sexuality and gender remain embedded within the formative legal 
structures of marriage and civil partnership.  Queer theory has only had borderline influence 
on gender and sexuality within the context of marriage and civil partnership and this 
influence can bee seen only in so far as same-sex relationships have become viewed as 
morally equivalent to their opposite-sex counterparts.  Even when gender has been legally 
accepted as changeable, the law has been used to affirm binarism and heteronormativity.  
Marriage and civil partnership remain embedded in a structure which has historically sought 
its validity in the complementary nature of the sexes; this structure has not changed and 
therefore, heteronormativism remains pre-eminent. 
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Finally, religious marriage and civil partnership remain completely insulated from queer 
theory in any discernible way.  The legal protections put in place to ensure religious 
organisations could continue to morally condemn same-sex relationships have, if anything, 
made religious marriage more toxic than it was before.  Not only this, but I would suggest 
that they have muddied what were, until then, legally clear waters.  It is perhaps unsurprising 
that queer influence is completely absent here. 
 Marriage and civil partnership are relationships which insist on compliance.  They are 
the relationship equivalent of a private member’s club with prescriptive membership criteria. 
Queer is a rejection of what is the norm.  Marriage and civil partnership could therefore never 
be queer institutions.  This thesis sought to establish if, in spite of this, queer theory has had 
any influence on the law on marriage and civil partnership.  The answer, I would submit, is 
that the influence of queer theory can be seen only on the margins. 
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